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AIDP – Non bis in idem 
 
Report for the Netherlands 
 
by André Klip and Harmen van der Wilt∗
 
 
I. Ne bis in idem at the domestic (national) level 
 
 
1. Is the ne bis in idem principle recognized by national law? 
 
Article 68, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code provides since 1886:1 “Except in cases in which 
judgments are susceptible to review, no person may be prosecuted again for an offence in 
respect of which a court in the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba has rendered 
final judgment on the substance of the charges against him.”2 The principle is usually 
characterised as the ne bis in idem principle.3 Article 68, paragraph 1, exclusively applies to 
court decisions. It does not prevent that prosecutions take place in situations where the 
accused was previously subjected to administrative sanctions, unless this is specifically 
prohibited.4 Thus, in principle, ne bis in idem is applicable only for decisions of criminal 
courts.5 However, it does not apply to the confiscation of the proceeds from crime. The 
protection is also awarded in respect of decisions of courts in the two other countries of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. This is logical because on 
the basis of the 1954 Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands: decisions can be enforced 
throughout the kingdom.6
 
                                                          
∗ André Klip is Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and International Criminal Law at Maastricht 
University. Harmen van der Wilt is senior lecturer in Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure and International 
Criminal Law at the University of Amsterdam. The rapporteurs are co-presidents of the Dutch section of the 
International Association of Penal Law. 
1 For an historical overview of the principle in the Netherlands before 1886, see J.M. van Bemmelen, Nemo 
debet bis vexari, Weekblad van het Recht 12736, 12737 and 12738 (1934). We refrain from discussing a ne bis 
protection given in Article 15 of the 1855 Act on the Responsibility of Ministers (Wet van 22 april 1855, 
houdende regeling der verantwoordelijkheden van de hoofden der ministeriële departementen. After refusing to 
order a criminal investigation by parliament a regular criminal prosecution may no longer be initiated. 
2 “Behoudens de gevallen waarin rechterlijke uitspraken voor herziening vatbaar zijn, kan niemand andermaal 
worden vervolgd wegens een feit waarover te zijnen aanzien bij gewijsde van de rechter in Nederland, de 
Nederlandse Antillen of Aruba onherroepelijk is beslist.” 
3 See also Peter Baauw, Ne Bis in Idem, in: Bert Swart and André Klip, International Criminal Law in the 
Netherlands, Freiburg im Breisgau 1997, p.75-84. 
4 Examples are the 1959 General Act on Taxes (Algemene wet inzake Rijksbelastingen) and the 1990 Military 
Disciplinary Sanctions Act (Wet militair tuchtrecht), as well as the 1995 General Act on Welfare (Algemene 
Bijstandswet). 
5 See A.H. Klip, Ne bis in idem en Bouterse, Nederlands Juristenblad 1998, p.2070 and J. de Hullu, Materieel 
strafrecht, Deventer 2000, p.519. 
6 The mutual enforceability was the reason to treat these decisions as equal to Dutch decisions. This raises the 
question whether the internal logic of the legislation would not have to extend the recognition to those foreign 
judgments, that could be enforced in the Netherlands on the basis of an applicable treaty on the enforcement of 
the execution of judgments. 
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On the basis of case law the recognition of ne bis in idem has been extended to those offences 
not formally indicted by the prosecutor but briefly mentioned by the prosecutor in the 
indictment, the so called “ad informandum” indictment. This is on condition that the accused 
admitted those offences and that the court took these offences into account in sentencing.7
 
In addition to Article 68, Article 74, paragraph 1, Penal Code stipulates “Before the court 
hearing has started, the public prosecutor may impose one or more conditions in order to 
prevent the prosecution for crimes, with the exception of those crimes for which, following 
the statutory description, a penalty of more than six years is provided, as well as for 
misdemeanours. By compliance with the conditions the right to prosecute no longer exists.”8 
Article 74a Penal Code stipulates that the Prosecutor may not refuse to accept an offer by the 
suspect to pay the fine for an offence, for which only a fine is provided, if the suspect is 
willing to pay the maximum fine provided for in the Code. 
 
Ne bis in idem is only applicable in respect of the same person. In this sense Dutch law 
distinguishes between the individual responsibility and the criminal responisbility of legal 
entities. The result is that a natural person may be prosecuted for the same facts after a legal 
entity was prosecuted for these facts and vice versa.9
 
Article 255 Code of Criminal Procedure should be mentioned here as well. If the Prosecutor 
has notified a suspect that he does not want to bring charges, he may no longer bring the case 
to court. This prevents the prosecutor from prosecuting even in case that there is no decision 
in the sense of Article 68 Penal Code. However, the protection is not absolute. If new 
inculpating evidence comes up, the Prosecutor is not hindered by Article 255 in bringing the 
case to court. Dogmatically this is not regarded as a breach of the ne bis in idem rule because 
the facts were not prosecuted before court.10 It also means that an investigation as such is not 
regarded as a prosecution that involves the protection of Article 68. In the rare cases that the 
Prosecution is inadmissible because of severe violations of the principles of a fair 
administration of justice (beginselen van een goede procesorde), the Prosecution cannot try its 
luck again. 
 
In addition to the Dutch Penal Code, the principle is recognised in conventions applicable to 
the Netherlands, like for instance Article 14, paragraph 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. A reservation was made by the Netherlands: “The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands accepts this provision only insofar as no obligations arise from it further to those 
set out in Article 68 of the Criminal Code of the Netherlands and Article 70 of the Criminal 
Code of the Netherlands Antilles as they now apply. They read: 1. Except in cases where 
court decisions are eligible for review, no person may be prosecuted again for an offence in 
respect of which a court in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Antilles has delivered an 
irrevocable judgement. 2. If the judgment has been delivered by some other court, the same 
person may not be prosecuted for the same offence in case of (I) acquittal or withdrawal of 
proceedings or (II) conviction followed by complete execution, remission or lapse of the 
                                                          
7 Supreme Court 13 February 1979, NJ 1979, 243. 
8 “De officier van justitie kan voor de aanvang van de terechtzitting een of meer voorwaarden stellen ter 
voorkoming van de strafvervolging wegens misdrijven, met uitzondering van die waarop naar de wettelijke 
omschrijving gevangenisstraf is gesteld van meer dan zes jaar, en wegens overtreding. Door voldoening aan die 
voorwaarden vervalt het recht tot strafvordering.” 
9 See G.J.M. Corstens, het Nederlands strafprocesrecht, 4th edition, Arnhem 2002, p.192. 
10 The relevance of Article 68 in this situation is that for both articles the same criterion for the “same facts” is 
being used. 
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sentence.”11 The Netherlands will not ratify the 1984 Seventh Protocol to the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.12
 
 
2. What is considered to be the decisive rationale of “ne bis in idem”? 
 
The guarantee contained in the requirement of a previously laid down criminal provision 
would be merely an illusion if a person could be troubled continually with various aspects of 
the same offence.13 The doctrine distinguishes the right not to be prosecuted twice from the 
right not to be punished twice. At a certain point in time the accused is entitled to be left 
alone. The state cannot jeopardise the accused unlimited times. The rule of law requires that if 
the state has initiated a prosecution versus one of its citizens that it will respect the outcome of 
the proceedings.14 Decisions of the court should therefore be respected.15 If res judicata 
would not be final, this would undermine the legitimacy of the state.16
 
 
3. Prerequisites and scope of ne bis in idem 
 
Criminal trials in the Netherlands may take place on the facts before two instances. The fact 
that a case is tried in first instance and in second instance both on the facts is not regarded as a 
violation of the principle. To the contrary, Dutch law regards the whole chain of procedures 
(first instance, second instance, Supreme Court) as an integral part of one prosecution within 
the meaning of Article 68. 
 
The principle can only be applied if the court gave a decision on the substances of the facts, 
following the procedure of Article 350 Code of Criminal Procedure. That means that the court 
considered whether the alleged fact has been proven, that the fact is a criminal offence, that 
the accused is criminally liable and what punishment should be imposed. Should the court 
apply Article 349, paragraph 1 Code of Criminal Procedure and declare the indictment null 
and void, declare itself incompetent to hear the case, declare the case inadmissible or suspend 
the prosecution, then this is not regarded as a final decision in the sense of Article 68.17 The 
decisions that deserve the protection of Article 68 are vrijspraak (acquittal), ontslag van 
rechtsvervolging (dismissal of the charges) and veroordeling (conviction).18
 
                                                          
11 Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden/ Treaty Series of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1978, 
177. 
12 The government fears that the extensive interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights of the words 
“criminal charge” may have consequences for administrative fines, which are excluded under Dutch law from 
appeal. It therefore does not want to submit the protocol to parliament for ratification. See Kamerstukken II, 
2002-2003, 28600 V, p.35. 
13 J. de Hullu, Materieel strafrecht, Deventer 2000, p.516-517. 
14 See J. Remmelink, Inleiding tot het Nederlandse strafrecht, 13e druk 1994, p. 585. 
15 Melai, aant. 5 op Art. 313 Sv. 
16 See G.J.M. Corstens, het Nederlands strafprocesrecht, 4th edition, Arnhem 2002, p.191. See further P.A.M. 
Mevis and T. Kooijmans, Herziening ten nadele, Roterdam 2003, p.106-117. 
17 See Constantijn Kelk, Studieboek materieel strafrecht, 2e druk 2001, p.60-61.                                                                                   
18 Recently the prohibition for the Supreme Court to revise an acquittal has been abolished. Article 430 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure has been repealed by Act of 31 October 2002, Stb. 2002, 539 entering into force on 
1 January 2003. 
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Most problems in practice result from the determination of whether we deal with “the same 
facts” (hetzelfde feit).19 The finding that the facts are the same as in an earlier case are 
essential to its application. The prevailing rule in the case law since 1963 is that we deal with 
the same facts if  “facts were committed under circumstances out of which apparently a link 
exists between the temporal coincidence of the acts and the essential coherence between acts 
and guilt of the perpetrator”.20 In a decision from 1972 the Supreme Court added an 
additional element to the criterion requiring that it concerns a similar reproach of guilt.21  
 
In sum, the Dutch approach combines the historical facts with the legal qualification of the 
crime for which the accused is prosecuted twice. If  a second crime based on the same 
historical facts protects entirely different values, then the accused may not enjoy the 
protection of Article 68. That does not lead to a principle that can be easily applied.22 An 
exception to the combination of the historical facts and the legal qualification is the out-of-
court-settlement (transactie). In these cases a legal qualification is the basis only. 
 
The application of the principle causes more and more problems with regard to certain crimes 
with very broad descriptions as to their application in time and place. An example of this is 
Article 140 Penal Code, criminalising participation to an organisation which aim it is to 
commit crimes. Is it possible to prosecute both for the participation in the criminal 
organisation as for one of the individual crimes the organisation has committed? In a 1996 
decision the Supreme Court ruled that a second prosecution may not take place, whereas a 
parallel prosecution could have taken place.23
 
In the 1963 decision the Supreme Court distinguished between the concept of same facts 
within the meaning of Article 68 and the concept of concursus of Article 55 and 57 Penal 
Code. The latter regulated the consequences for one historical fact that may generate more 
than one offence. The outcome was that the accused may be prosecuted for more than one 
crime based on the same historical facts, as long as the prosecution takes place at the same 
time.24
 
This corresponds to the limitations under which a Prosecutor may amend an indictment 
already issued. Article 313 Code of Criminal Procedure provides that under no circumstances 
an amendment may be granted that would amount to other facts in the meaning of Article 68 
Penal Code. In the Meindert Tjoelker decision the Supreme Court held that in cases of 
amendment of the indictment it is not necessary that the purpose of the offences is the same.25 
However, an amendment is inadmissible if the purpose of the different offences would divert 
                                                          
19 It is interesting to note that the parliamentary history of Article 68 does not pay attention to what should be 
understood as “fact” (feit). See H.J. Smidt, Geschiedenis van het Wetboek van Strafrecht 1891, 1e deel, p.502-
508. 
20 Supreme Court 17 December 1963, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1964, 385: “onder omstandigheden waaruit 
blijkt van een zodanig verband met betrekking tot de gelijktijdigheid van de gedragingen en de wezenlijke 
samenhang in het handelen en de schuld van de dader, dat de strekking van artikel 68 Sr meebrengt, dat zij in de 
zin van dat artikel als hetzelfde feit zijn aan te merken.” See for earlier case law views on the same facts De 
Hullu, o.c., p.524-525. 
21 Supreme Court, 18 January 1972, NJ 1972, 378. 
22 See also J.A.W. Lensing, “Feit”, artikel 68 Wetboek van Strafrecht en dubbele vervolging, in: Dynamisch 
strafrecht (Corstens-bundel), Arnhem 1995, p.203-220. 
23 Supreme Court 26 November 1996, NJ 1997, 209. 
24 De Hullu (o.c., p.534-537) critisizes that the concepts differ, but also admits that it is difficult to present an 
alternative. 
25 The case gives the impression that the Court might be more willing to extend the concept of the same facts in a 
situation of an amendment of the indictment then in case of a second prosecution. However, this is speculation. 
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on essential points.26 In this context the Supreme Court accepted an amendment of the 
indictment by which the period in which the crimes have been committed was extended.27 At 
first sight it seems that the Supreme Court has given up the requirement of a temporal 
coincidence of the crime(s). However, such amendments have been granted with specific 
crimes only, such as participation in a criminal organisation. Since the crime as such is 
committed over a longer period by definition, the exactitude of the temporal coincidence is 
less decisive. De Hullu concludes that basically the whole question is determined and decided 
by the factual circumstances of each case.28
 
 
4. What are the legal consequences of the application of ne bis in idem? 
 
As soon as a decision is irrevocable the protection of Article 68 is called to life.29 Unlike the 
recognition of foreign decisions, for Dutch decisions it is not required that these have been 
(completely) enforced. Under Dutch law the consequences of a finding of a ne bis in idem 
situation are very clear. It means that the prosecutor has lost the right to prosecute and that the 
case will be declared inadmissible. The Netherlands apply the Erledigungsprinzip. No 
exceptions to the rule exist, even in cases in which new inculpatory evidence appears that 
would certainly have led to a different outcome than the acquittal in the first trial.  
 
However, compliance with the conditions set by the Prosecution is open for some form of 
review. Article 12 and following of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows for a complaint by 
an interested person against a decision by the Prosecutor not to prosecute.30 If the Court of 
Appeal, that is competent in such cases, subsequently orders the Prosecution to prosecute, he 
must comply with that order (Art. 74b Penal Code) and the earlier out-of-court settlement is 
declared null and void.  
 
 
5. Are there exceptions from the principle of ne bis in idem? 
 
Review of convictions may only take place if that is favourable to the convicted person 
(Article 457 Code of Criminal Procedure). Such a review is limited to two circumstances. The 
first is when different court decisions are incompatible with each other. The second is when 
evidence subsequently makes it likely that, had the trial court known the newly discovered 
facts, it would have taken a more favourable decision for the convicted person. In practice 
requests for review are hardly ever declared admissible.31 Theoretically, review (herziening) 
is not regarded as being related to ne bis in idem. The initiative lies with the convicted person 
and his situation may not get worse as a result of this procedure. In conclusion: there are no 
exceptions to the principle. 
 
 
II. Ne bis in idem in cases involving “horizontal (trans)national concurrence” 
                                                          
26 Supreme Court 2 November 1999, NJ 2000, 174. 
27 Supreme Court 2 July 2002, LJN: AE3728 and Supreme Court 24 December 2002, LJN: AE9043. 
28 J. de Hullu, commentary to Supreme Court 2 November 1999, NJ 2000, 174. 
29 In cases of compliance with the conditions as meant in Article 74, the right to complain about non prosecution 
lapses three months after an interested person learnt of the application of this provision. See Article 12k Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
30 Regardless of the reasons for that decision, or whether a normal decision as meant in Article 255 Code of 
Criminal Procedure or Article 68 Penal Code was taken. 
31 A recent exception is Supreme Court 26 June 2001, NJ 2001, 564. 
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1. Preliminary substantive-legal question 
 
The general rapporteurs correctly observe that the proliferation of jurisdictional claims 
augments the risk of multiple prosecutions in several countries. In view of the efforts to 
restrict double prosecution in international perspective as far as possible, these developments 
call for proper solutions for positive jurisdiction conflicts as a matter of urgency. We will deal 
with this question in the final part of our report. 
 
As far as the Dutch criminal law system is concerned, in times past it showed a remarkably 
restrained position as to the establishment and exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.32 Out of 
respect for foreign res judicata and in order to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, the only bases 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction recognised by the Dutch Criminal Code until recently were the 
active personality principle and the protective principle. The gradual expansion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction after World War II was triggered by two different motives, the 
inclination to  afford better protection for national interests abroad and international solidarity 
which mainly manifested itself in the ratification and implementation of multilateral treaties 
aiming at the repression of international crimes.  
 
As in almost all criminal law systems, the territoriality principle is the prime basis for 
jurisdiction in the Dutch Penal Code (Article 2). Application of the principle begs the question 
where the conduct involving the commission of a crime is located, a question left for case law 
to resolve. According to a rather ancient decision of the Supreme Court, the locus delicti may 
not only be the place where the perpetrator physically acted but also the place where the 
instrument used by the perpetrator had its effect.33 Recent case law of the Supreme Court 
sustains the exercise of jurisdiction over accomplices acting abroad in support of crimes 
which are committed on Dutch territory.34  Whereas this expansion of jurisdiction had already 
been established in specific provisions in the Economic Offences Act (Article 3) and the 
Opium Act (Article 13), it is now generally acknowledged for all offences. In the reverse 
situation – participation in the Netherlands in an offence committed abroad – it is usually 
assumed that the Netherlands have jurisdiction, but whether this power is subject to additional 
conditions (for instance whether the conduct constitutes a criminal offence under the law of 
the foreign state) is still not entirely clarified.35 Article 3 of the Penal Code containing the so 
called principle of the flag establishes jurisdiction over offences committed on board a Dutch 
vessel or aircraft and can be considered as an extension of the territoriality principle. 
 
The protective principle is applicable to a limited number of offences which are committed 
abroad and affect vital Dutch interests. For one thing, Article 73 of the General Act on Taxes 
extends Dutch jurisdiction over tax crimes, mentioned in the Act, which have been committed 
abroad, suggesting that Dutch financial interests might be jeopardised from without.36 
                                                          
32 For a useful survey in English of the Dutch law on criminal jurisdiction, see Marius Teengs Gerritsen, 
Jurisdiction, in: Bert Swart and André Klip (Eds.) International Criminal Law in the Netherlands, Beiträge und 
Materialien aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, Band S 66, Freiburg 
im Breisgau 1997, p. 49-73  
33 Supreme Court 6 April 1954, NJ 1954, 368 (Singapore-case). 
34 Supreme Court 18 February 1997, NJ 1997, 628. 
35 For a critical analysis of case law and legal doctrine, see H.D. Wolswijk, Locus delicti en rechtsmacht, Gouda 
Quint: Deventer 1998, p. 227-244 
36 Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen (General Act on Taxes), 2 July 1959, Stb. 1959, 301. We are indebted 
to Mr. C. F. Mulder for providing us with useful information in this regard. 
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Furthermore, Article 4 of the Penal Code enumerates a number of offences to which the 
protective principle applies. The list comprises inter alia offences against the security of the 
(Dutch) state (Article 4, paragraph 1), offences against the royal dignity (paragraph 2), 
falsification of official documents and the offence of impeding Dutch authorities in their 
investigation of criminal offences outside Dutch territory (paragraph 5). Some paragraphs of 
Article 4, notably paragraphs 7 and 8, do not only aim at the protection of Dutch aircraft and 
vessels against unlawful seizure or other offences, but serve to implement a number of 
multilateral treaties, broadening the scope of criminal law protection to foreign aviation and 
shipping mainly against terrorist offences as well.37 However, the exercise of jurisdiction is 
premised on the condition that the suspect is present on Dutch territory and thus the regulation 
exemplifies the application of the aut dedere, aut judicare-principle. Moreover, the 
Netherlands has made reservations to most treaties of this kind, indicating that prosecution by 
the Netherlands is only a secondary option if the Netherlands has received and rejected an 
extradition request from a state party who is better equipped to start criminal proceedings on 
the basis of the territoriality principle or the active personality principle.38  As is well known, 
the aut dedere, aut judicare-principle is generally considered as the modern variant of the 
universality principle. The circumspect and restrictive application of the aut dedere, aut 
judicare-principle in the Netherlands corroborates our thesis that the Dutch are rather 
reluctant to establish and exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. The unrestricted universality 
principle is only applicable to piracy and counterfeiting currency.39 Both regulations derive 
from explicit treaty obligations which reveals another – though closely connected – aspect of 
the Dutch view on expanding jurisdiction: the application of the principle of universality is 
only possible if a treaty not only allows but enjoins state parties to establish jurisdiction. A 
comprehensive system of jurisdiction based on the principle of aut dedere, aut judicare in 
relation to the core crimes, belonging to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is 
envisaged in the draft Statute for international crimes which implements the Rome Statute and 
which will shortly (partially) replace the 1952 Act on criminal law in time of war. 
 
Similar prove of the self imposed restraint of the Netherlands as regards extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is the rejection of the passive personality principle. Only the 1952 Act on criminal 
law in time of war explicitly recognises this principle as a basis for jurisdiction. To a certain 
extent, paragraphs 9 –11 of Article 4 which declare Dutch criminal law applicable to offences 
against internationally protected persons in Dutch service and corruption committed abroad 
against Dutch civil servants reveal concern for Dutch nationals abroad. Nevertheless, the 
protection of Dutch (abstract) interests seems to prevail which indicates that these are 
examples of the protective principle. Moreover, the exercise of jurisdiction is premised on the 
condition that the conduct constitutes a criminal offence in the foreign state as well. 
The Dutch inclination to put the exercise of jurisdiction in the key of international co-
operation in criminal affairs comes to the fore in Article 4a Penal Code which contains the so 
called representation principle. According to this provision the Netherlands may derive 
criminal jurisdiction from a foreign state, provided that such a transfer of proceedings is based 
on a treaty. 
 
                                                          
37 These treaties are the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1971 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and its 1988 Protocol and 
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its 
Protocol.  
38 For obvious reasons this reservation has not been made to the 1984 Torture Convention. 
39 Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 5 Dutch Penal Code. 
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Finally, mention should be made of the active personality principle which features in Article 5 
Penal Code in both a restrictive and an unrestrictive version. According to Article 5 paragraph 
1 sub 1 Dutch criminal law is applicable to Dutch nationals committing certain criminal 
offences abroad – including bigamy and making oneself unsuitable for military service – 
irrespective of the question whether these acts constitute criminal offences in the foreign state. 
Article 5, paragraph 1 sub 2 on the other hand, introduces the requirement of double 
criminality as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals who have 
committed crimes abroad. In the past the provision served as a compensation for the non 
extradition of Dutch nationals and in this respect there is  a certain connection (though a weak 
one) with the concept of international solidarity as the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.40 
Following EU decisions, the Netherlands have introduced a domicile principle in Article 5a 
Penal Code in respect of sexual abuse of minors in 2002. 
 
 
2. In your country, is the principle of ne bis in idem also prescribed on a transnational 
level? 
 
The relevant provisions in Dutch law, governing the ne bis in idem-effect of foreign res 
judicata within the Dutch legal order are Article 68, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Penal Code. 
Article 68, paragraph 2 precludes criminal proceedings in the Netherlands after a final 
judgement has been rendered by a foreign court in case of acquittal or dismissal of the charges 
and in case of conviction, if punishment has been imposed, followed by complete 
enforcement, pardon or lapse of time. Furthermore, according to paragraph 3 of Article 68 
criminal prosecution in the Netherlands is barred by the fulfilment of a condition set by the 
competent authorities of a foreign state to prevent prosecution. We will deal more thoroughly 
with the legal content of these judicial decisions in paragraphs 3 and 4. 
 
Although the Dutch regulation of transnational ne bis in idem lacks constitutional status, it is 
generally considered as being rather generous towards foreign res judicata, offering a wide 
measure of protection against double jeopardy.41 Moreover, the Netherlands is a party to 
several international treaties which contain provisions on the principle of ne bis in idem 
within an international context. If these international provisions were to offer wider protection 
than the national regulation, they would certainly prevail in view of Articles 93 and 94 of the 
Dutch Constitution. These constitutional provisions proclaim primacy of conventional law 
over national law, including statutes, provided that the international regulations are binding on 
all persons. Undoubtedly, provisions on ne bis in idem are self-executing as they confer rights 
on individual persons. 
 
Within the realm of conventions which deal with the international ne bis in idem-principle a 
distinction can be made between human rights treaties and conventions on international co-
operation in criminal affairs. As to the first category, Article 14, paragraph 7, of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that no one shall be liable to be 
tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or 
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country. The Netherlands 
has made a reservation to this provision, indicating that it would not recognise the ne bis in 
                                                          
40 Cf. M.Teengs Gerritsen, o.c. (1987), p. 61.  
41 Cf. Peter Baauw, Ne Bis in Idem, in: Bert Swart and André Klip (Eds.) International Criminal Law in the 
Netherlands, Beiträge und Materialien aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales 
Strafrecht, Band S 66, Freiburg im Breisgau 1997, p. 79; Tom Vander Beken, Forumkeuze in het internationaal 
strafrecht, Maklu: Antwerpen-Apeldoorn 1999, p. 270. 
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idem principle to extend beyond Article 68 of the Dutch Penal Code as it applied at the 
moment of ratification.42 The background to this reservation was that the Dutch government 
was in doubt whether Article 14, paragraph 7, would only cover the national application or 
also the international  application of the ne bis in idem principle. In the latter case the courts 
would probably be obliged to deduct the sentence served abroad in case the sentence had not 
completely been enforced, a requirement which Article 68, paragraph 2 does not mention. 
Here we stumble on one of the weak spots of the Dutch regulation of the international ne bis 
in idem, a point which we will explore in more detail below. Anyway, the Dutch fear was 
unwarranted, as the Human Rights Committee has ruled that Article 14, paragraph 7, does not 
apply to foreign res judicata.43
 
The European Convention on Human Rights does not contain provisions on ne bis in idem. 
On several occasions the former European Commission on Human Rights denied the 
applicability of Article 6 to multiple prosecutions for the same fact, although it did not 
completely rule out the possibility that in specific circumstances a second prosecution might 
militate against the fair trial-principle of Article 6.44 Article 4, paragraph 1 of the 1984 
Seventh Protocol to the European Convention however, does contain a provision on ne bis in 
idem. The phrasing of the provision excludes any misunderstanding that it does not apply to 
decisions of foreign courts.45 Anyhow, the Protocol does not affect the Dutch regulation, as 
the Netherlands will not ratify this instrument.  
 
Two instruments on international co-operation in criminal affairs – the European Convention 
on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements and the European Convention on the 
Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters – have rather extensive regulations on the ne bis 
in idem principle on the international level, which are not related to the international co-
operation.46  Both regulations are practically similar in content. These conventions have been 
drawn up within the institutional framework of the Council of Europe and the Netherlands is a 
party to both conventions, a privilege which it shares with a growing number of states.47 For 
the Netherlands these regulations are of minor importance, as Article 68, paragraphs 2 and 3 
offer wider protection. Both conventions allow for exceptions in those cases in which a state’s 
jurisdiction is founded on the territoriality principle, when it’s vital interests are in jeopardy or 
when it’s civil servants are implicated in the commission of an offence. The Dutch provision 
makes no allowance for such exceptions. 
 
                                                          
42 See supra I.1. 
43 UN Human Rights Committee 2 November 1987, Report 204/1986, A.P. v. Italy, Rechtspraak 
Vreemdelingenrecht 1988, 95. 
44 European Commission on Human Rights, 13 July 1970, Applications nr. 4212/69, in: Collections of Decisions 
and Reports 35, p. 151 and 154. Compare also H.G.M. Krabbe and W.F. van Hattum, De ne bis in idem-regel in 
de rechtspraak van het EHRM, in: 30 Delikt en Delinkwent (2000), p. 8. 
45 Article 4, par. 1 reads: ‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the 
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State’ (italics added).  
46 European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, Strasbourg 28 May 1970, ETS No. 
70, Articles 53-57; European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, Strasbourg 15 
May 1972, ETS No. 73, Articles 35-37. 
47 The European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgements is ratified by Austria, Cyprus, 
Danmark, Estonia, Georgia, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden and Turkey. 
Georgia, Iceland and San Marino have not ratified the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in 
Criminal Matters, but all the other states just mentioned did. Besides, the Convention on the Transfer of 
Proceedings in Criminal Matters has been ratified by Albania, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Ukraine and 
Yugoslavia (reference date: 1-1-2003). 
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The 1987 Convention between the Member States of the European Communities on Double 
Jeopardy specifically deals with the issue of ne bis in idem in transnational relations.48 This 
convention has largely been superseded by Articles 54 to 58 of the 1990 Convention applying 
the Schengen Agreement.49 Basically, these regulations follow the same approach as the 
Conventions of the Council of Europe, although they offer more refined solutions in a number 
of respects. For one thing, Article 54 of the Schengen Convention maintains the possible 
exception to the ban of bis in idem, if the crime has been committed on the territory of the 
state-party considering a second prosecution, but this exception is precluded if the crime has 
partially been committed on the territory of the state who irrevocably decided the case in 
criminal proceedings. Secondly, the Schengen Convention enjoins state parties to make 
explicit declarations in case they want to invoke the exceptions provided for in Article 54. 
Finally, both the 1987 Convention and the Schengen Convention do not only preclude 
multiple prosecution after sentence has been passed involving deprivation of liberty, but also 
offer protection if the sentence amounted to the imposition of a fine. 
 
The risk of insoluble conflicts between the provisions of the conventions just mentioned is 
virtually extinct. As the provisions in the human rights treaties do not apply to international ne 
bis in idem, any conflict with the regulations of the other conventions is by definition 
precluded. The Schengen-provisions will govern the relations between the state-parties, 
prevailing over the older instruments, as they cover the same issue and figure as lex posterior 
vis à vis their predecessors. 
 
Reference need to be made to recent developments within the European Union. On 11 
February 2003, the Court of Justice took a decision concerning Article 54 Convention 
Applying the Schengen  Agreement, and interpreted the concept of an “area of freedom, 
justice and security”, as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Court of Appeal in Köln 
(Oberlandesgericht Köln) and the Court of First Instance in Veurne (Rechtbank van Eerste 
Aanleg te Veurne) had lodged the first request for a preliminary ruling with the Court of 
Justice.50 Does Article 54 Schengen preclude a second prosecution before a German court 
when according to Dutch law the matter can no longer be prosecuted because it is already 
settled? Is Belgian Prosecution and the claim of the civil party barred if the accused concluded 
a settlement with the Prosecution in Germany? Is it relevant that the form of settlement is 
unknown in the state that wants to prosecute? Especially the transnational application of non 
bis in idem suffers from problems of interpretation.51 In this case not only the exact 
formulation of the non bis in idem principle in the Convention is important, but also its 
context: they are the area of freedom, justice and security and the principle of mutual 
recognition.52 If one regards the European Union as a single judicial area (whatever that 
                                                          
48 Brussels, 25 May 1987, Trb. 1987, 167. The Convention has been ratified by and is provisionally applied 
between Danmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal.    
49 Convention applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition 
of Checks at their Common Borders, Schengen 19 June 1990. Later on, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain have 
ratified the Convention. 
50 Request of the Oberlandesgericht Cologne of 30 March 2001 for a preliminary ruling in the criminal 
proceedings against Hüseyn Gözütok, Case Number C-187/01, OJ 2001, C 212/10; Reference for a preliminary 
ruling by the Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg te Veurne by Judgment of 4 May 2001 in criminal proceedings 
brought against Klaus Fritz Brügge; civil party: Benedikt Leliaert, Case Number C-385/01, OJ 2001, C 348/15. 
51 See J.A.W. Lensing, Ne bis in idem in strafzaken; een rechtsvergelijkende en internationaalstrafrechtelijk 
oriëntatie, Preadvies voor de Nederlandse Vereniging van Rechtsvergelijking 2000, No.60, see also the 
interventions, in No.61, 2001. 
52 See also the Framework Decision on a European Arrest Warrant of 13 June 2002. 
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exactly may mean), concurrent jurisdiction forces to recognition of decisions taken by other 
authorities in the same area.  
 
The Court of Justice starts off by mentioning that nowhere in the Treaty on European Union 
nor in the Schengen Convention is the application of Article 54 “made conditional upon 
harmonisation, or at the least approximation, of the criminal laws of the Member States 
relating to procedures whereby further prosecution is banned.”53 The Court further holds that 
the objective of Article 54 “is to ensure that no one is prosecuted on the same facts in several 
Member States on account of his having exercised his right to freedom of movement.”54 The 
latter phrase should not be interpreted that the origin of Article 54 aimed at limiting the 
protection to those convicted European Union citizens who are entitled to free movement. A 
more convincing argument is that Article 54 should also apply to out-of-court-settlements 
because otherwise only those who commit serious crimes would profit from the protection 
offered by the principle. Although the decision can be welcomed because it will protect 
citizens and prevent second prosecutions, it is absolutely clear from the negotiations on the 
Schengen Convention that the parties did not want to extend its protection over other 
decisions than court decisions. 
 
The third institutional framework in which the ne bis in idem-principle has found recognition 
is the European Union. The conventions which have been drafted in order to deal with the 
protection of the financial interests of the EU in particular, contain provisions which aim to 
prevent double criminal prosecution. Article 7 of the Convention on the Protection of the 
European Communities’ Financial Interests is modelled after the regulation in the Schengen 
Convention.55 Similar provisions are to be found in the First Protocol to the Convention on 
the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests (Article 7) and in the 
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of  Member States of the European Union (Article 10).56 Of special 
interest is Article 12, paragraph 2 of the Second Protocol to the Convention on the Protection 
of the European Communities’ Financial Interests, as it extends the application of the ne bis in 
idem-principle to the benefit of legal persons as well.57
 
The Framework Decision on the European Arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States distinguishes – as far as the effect of prior prosecutions are concerned 
- between grounds for mandatory non-execution and grounds for optional non-execution.58 
According to Article 3, paragraph 2, a final judgment in another Member State constitutes a 
ground for mandatory refusal, provided that, if the requested person was sentenced, the 
sentence has been served, or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the 
law of the sentencing Member State. The executing state may invoke a final judgment in a 
third state, subject to the same proviso’s, as a ground for optional refusal. Similarly, decisions 
not to prosecute for the offence on which the arrest warrant is based or to halt proceedings, 
either in the executing state or in another Member State, may serve as a legitimate reason for 
the state to deny the execution of the arrest warrant (Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 5).  
      
                                                          
53 Court of Justice, 11 February 2003, joined cases Hüseyin Gözütok (C-187/01) and Klaus Brügge (C-385/01), 
par. 32. 
54 Idem, par. 38. 
55 Brussels , 26 July 1995, OJ 1995 C 316/33. 
56 Respectively Brussels, 27 September 1996,  OJ 1996 C 313/3 and Brussels, 26 May 1997, OJ 1997 C 195/1. 
57 Brussels, 19 June 1997, OJ 1997 C 221/11. 
58 Brussels, 13 June 2002, OJ 2002, L 190/1.  
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Although the ne bis in idem-provisions on an international level certainly contribute to the 
reduction of the risk of multiple prosecutions, a more positive approach involving the quest 
for finding the best place of prosecution would be preferable.59 Inter-state consultation in the 
pre-trial phase is an important first step to accomplish this goal. The consultation-procedure 
envisaged in Article 30 of the European Convention on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings 
may serve as a model.60 The European Union has followed suit by incorporating such 
consultation-procedures in several of their instruments.61 Even more appropriate would be a 
central European body, supervising and co-ordinating the initiatives of EU-Member States to 
start criminal proceedings and giving them advise as how to centralise the prosecution in one 
Member State, in order to avoid jurisdiction conflicts and double jeopardy. In this field 
EUROJUST may serve a useful function in the near future, as this task is especially 
mentioned in the Framework decision which created the organisation.62  
 
The procedural consequence of an imminent double prosecution in violation of Article 68, 
paragraph 2 or 3 is that the Public Prosecutor will be held inadmissible in his claim. 
According to Article 348 of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, the court has to inquire ex 
officio whether the Prosecutor’s claim is admissible. The defendant may invoke the 
inadmissibility of the Prosecutor and the verdict must, in case of rejection of the defence, 
contain a formal and motivated explanation (Article 358, paragraph 3 Code of Criminal 
Procedure). Subsequently, the defendant may appeal against the judgement and finally lodge 
an appeal with the Supreme Court. 
 
 
3. Prerequisites and scope of the horizontal application of ne bis in idem  
 
The interpretation of the concept of “same offence” in Dutch case law for the purpose of the 
application of the ne bis in idem-principle has already been addressed exhaustively in the first 
section of this report. It might be useful to summarise the main features and point at some 
specific problems which may arise in the context of ne bis in idem on an international level, 
as the General Rapporteurs suggest. The Dutch Supreme Court takes as point of reference  
whether there is a close connection as to the simultaneity of the behaviour and an essential 
coherence of the acts and the nature of the reproaches that can be made to a person.63 This 
middle of the road approach implies that the courts attach value to both the factual situation 
and the legal assessment of the offence. In a more recent decision the Supreme Court held that 
                                                          
59 On this issue: Tom Vander Beken, Gert Vermeulen, Soetekin Steverlynck and Stefan Thomaes, Finding the 
Best Place for Prosecution; European study on jurisdiction criteria, Maklu: Antwerpen/Apeldoorn 2002. 
60 This provision stipulates that any Contracting State which is aware of proceedings pending in another 
Contracting State against the same person in respect of the same offence must consider whether it can either 
waive or suspend its own proceedings, or transfer them to the other State. 
61 Vander Beken et al. (o.c., 2002, p. 31) mention Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Council Framework Decision of 
29 May 2000 on increasing protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in 
connection with the introduction of the Euro, OJ 14 June 2000, L 140/1 which reads as follows: ‘Where more 
than one Member State has jurisdiction and has the opportunity for viable prosecution of an offence based on the 
same facts, the Member States involved shall co-operate in deciding which Member State shall prosecute the 
offender or offenders with a view to centralising the prosecution in a single Member State, where possible’. 
62 Council decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious 
crime, OJ 6 March 2002, L63/1. See especially Articles 6 a sub ii (Eurojust acts through its national members) 
and 7 a sub ii (Eurojust acts as a college): ‘Eurojust can ask the competent authorities of the Member States to 
accept that another Member State is in a better position to undertake an investigation’.  
63 See for instance Supreme Court 21 November 1961, NJ 1961, 89 and Supreme Court 5 February 1963, NJ 
1963, 320. 
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if the purpose and scope of the various criminal provisions were to diverge substantially, the 
ne bis in idem-principle would not apply.64
 
The interpretation of the ne bis in idem-principle on an international level does not differ from 
the one applied in the domestic context. Case law is scarce, but we may point at an interesting 
decision in which the Supreme Court overturned the District Court’s ruling that export of soft 
drugs from the Netherlands and import into Belgium constituted different offences. The 
defendant, after having been convicted for the latter offence in Belgium, stood trial again for 
the former offence in the Netherlands. The Supreme Court suggested that, in view of the 
simultaneity of the conduct and the similar scope of  the criminal provisions, prosecution in 
the Netherlands was barred under Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code.65  
 
The General rapporteurs have put some pertinent questions as to how the identity of the crime 
might be affected by different concepts of substantive criminal law in the various countries 
and the resulting differences in their legal assessments. Given the absence of relevant case law 
we find it hard to come up with clear cut answers, but we might tentatively submit some 
solutions. In view of the applicable standards expounded above, it is suggested that courts will 
shift the emphasis on the factual circumstances of the case, taking into account that criminal 
provisions in different countries do not always match.66 They might investigate whether the 
foreign criminal provision corresponds to a large extent with the Dutch indictment and only in 
case of substantial divergence conclude that ne bis in idem does not apply.  
 
It is important here to note that the concept of non-bis-in-idem in civil law countries and 
double jeopardy in common law countries differs considerably.67 Whereas common law 
countries in principle provide for one trial on the facts, civil law countries may regard an 
appeal on the facts as included in the concept “one trial”. In addition, many civil law countries 
will provide for an appeal by the prosecutor against an acquittal. These differences of opinion 
as to the extent of the protection of the principle or rule are important in the understanding of 
the principle as it emerges from national law or as it appears in Statutes of international 
criminal tribunals. In this context it is important to note that the recognition of a foreign 
decision as relating to the same facts is unilateral and does not bind the state whose decision 
has been recognised to attach a similar protection. As a consequence, even in situations that 
both states (or both jurisdictions) apply a transnational recognition of the ne bis in idem 
principle the application in practice may differ tremendously due to the diverging concepts of 
“same facts”. 
 
Some clues may be offered by reasoning by analogy. In the domestic context the Supreme 
Court has been confronted with the problem whether, in view of the ne bis in idem-principle, 
a conviction for participation in a criminal organisation – constituting a criminal offence 
                                                          
64 Supreme Court 2 November 1999, NJ 2000, 174. In this particular case the Supreme Court did not consider 
the criminal law provisions prohibiting  ‘public assault and battery’ and ‘manslaughter’ to be substantially 
divergent in their scope and purpose. 
65 Supreme Court, 13 December 1994, NJ 1995, 252. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in this 
decision deviates from previous case law and even defies Article 36 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
(New York, 30 March 1961, Trb. 1962, 30). After all, paragraph 2, sub a (i) of Article 36 prescribes that each of 
the offences enumerated in the paragraph 1 – including importation and exportation – shall be considered as a 
distinct offence, if committed in different countries. However, the provision makes allowance for deviations, 
based on constitutional limitations, the legal system and domestic law of a State Party.   
66 Noyon/Langemeyer/Remmelink, Wetboek van Strafrecht (loose-leaf commentary on the Dutch Penal Code) – 
Suppl. 97 (June 1998), Vol. I, p. 486b: “It is unlikely to happen frequently that a decision of a foreign court will 
cover entirely the same “fact” under Dutch criminal law.” 
67 See The Law Commission, Double Jeopardy, Consultation Paper No.156, 1999 and Lensing, o.c. 
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under Article 140 of the Dutch Penal Code – would preclude a new prosecution for the very 
offences, if they were actually to be committed. Although in the opinion of the Supreme Court 
the preparatory act of participation and the actual commission of the crimes constituted 
several offences in the sense of Article 68 Penal Code, a new prosecution would militate 
against the principles of a proper criminal procedure.68  A similar line of reasoning might be 
followed in the case of judging a continuous offence in the light of the ne bis in idem-
principle.69 However, the Public Prosecutor may circumvent the ne bis in idem-effect by 
taking care to charge the aspects of the continuous offence at different time intervals.70  
As far as the multiple prosecution of legal persons and principals, acting on behalf of the legal 
person, is concerned the Supreme Court follows the same approach. In this case the ne bis in 
idem-principle is not applicable, for the simple reason that the prosecution does not concern 
the same person. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court opined that in exceptional circumstances a 
prosecution of the principals, after the legal person had been convicted and sentenced to a 
considerable fine, might violate the principle of an equitable appraisal of interests.71
 
As expounded above, the protection against double jeopardy offered by Article 68, paragraphs 
2 and 3 is rather broad, as the provisions do not differentiate between the kind of offence, the 
state where the foreign judgement has been pronounced, the place where the offence was 
committed or the jurisdictional basis of the foreign judgement.72 None of the exceptions 
which are proposed in the treaties to mitigate the effects of the international ne bis in idem-
principle are incorporated in Dutch legislation. A rather complicated issue involves the 
question whether only decisions by foreign criminal courts would bar prosecution in the 
Netherlands or that the ne bis in idem-effect would extend to judgements of other courts or 
public authorities as well. It is uncontested that disciplinary measures and civil judgements do 
not preclude criminal proceedings in relation to the same facts.73 However, the outcome may 
be different in case of cumulation of fiscal fines or custom fines, imposed by tax officials, and 
criminal proceedings, due to the fact that the Supreme Court, following the autonomous 
interpretation of ‘criminal charge’ by the European Court on Human Rights, has assumed that 
the fiscal fine has a punitive and deterrent purpose.74  In the domestic context the problem has 
been solved by the introduction of the una via-principle, incorporated in several statutes, 
which enjoins the public authorities to choose between administrative proceedings and 
criminal law enforcement.75 In fiscal affairs this solution would be less viable in view of the 
divergent purpose of tax law and criminal law enforcement.76      
 
Article 68, paragraph 2 stipulates that criminal prosecution in the Netherlands for the same 
criminal offence is foreclosed if final judgement has been rendered by a foreign court which 
                                                          
68 Supreme Court, 26 November 1996, NJ 1997, 207. 
69 The concept of “continuous offence” for the purpose of reduction of punishment is recognized in Article 56 of 
the Dutch Penal Code. 
70 Noyon/Langemeyer/Remmelink, o.c., (1998), p. 492a and Supreme Court 14 June 1994, Delikt en Delinkwent 
94.392. 
71 Supreme Court 20 June 1990, NJ 1990, 811. Compare also A.L.J. van Strien, De rechtspersoon in het 
strafproces, SDU: Den Haag 1996, p. 195-196. 
72 Baauw, o.c., (1997), p. 79. Compare also H.G.M. Krabbe and H.M. Poelman, Enkele aspecten van het ne bis 
in idem-beginsel in internationaal verband, in: Liber Amicorum Th.W. van Veen, Arnhem 1985, p. 138. 
73 Noyon/Langemeyer/Remmelink, o.c., (1998), p. 485. 
74 Supreme Court 19 June 1985, NJ 1986, 116. 
75 Cf. First part of this report and J.A.W. Lensing, Ne bis in idem in strafzaken, Preadvies voor de Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, Arnhem 2000, p. 121-125.   
76 Nevertheless, Article 67o of the General Act on Taxes rules out the imposition of an administrative fine if 
criminal proceedings have been pursued and reached the trial phase or if the right to institute criminal 
proceedings has expired. 
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means that the judgement is irrevocable. In the Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7 to the 
ECHR the term ‘irrevocable’ is clarified in the sense that ‘no further ordinary remedies are 
available or when the parties have exhausted such remedies or have permitted the time-limit 
to expire without availing themselves of them’.77 In other words: pending criminal 
proceedings abroad do not preclude prosecution in the Netherlands. Furthermore, Article 68, 
paragraph 2 only applies if the foreign court has pronounced on the merits of the case. 
Preliminary decisions like the annulment of the indictment, the court’s declaration that it lacks 
jurisdiction, the inadmissibility of the Public Prosecutor or the suspension of prosecution do 
not bar prosecution in the Netherlands.78   
 
An acquittal or a dismissal of the charges by a foreign court on the other hand, constitute 
absolute impediments against prosecution in the Netherlands. Neither the law itself nor legal 
doctrine make any distinction as to the reason why the person has been acquitted. Even an 
acquittal because of lack of evidence, while evidence would be abundant in the Netherlands, 
would impede new criminal proceedings. In the same vein, a dismissal of charges based on 
the consideration that the conduct does not constitute a criminal offence in the foreign state 
will preclude prosecution. The standard used by the Supreme Court is whether the foreign 
judgement, according to Dutch law, amounts to an acquittal or a dismissal of charges; the 
Court has explicitly rejected the opinion that the Dutch judiciary would have to inquire 
whether it would have reached a similar decision in the analogous situation.79      
 
The absolute protection against double jeopardy that Article 68, paragraph 2 offers – at least 
as far as acquittal and dismissal of charges is concerned – has triggered a discussion among 
learned writers whether the Dutch regulation is not too benevolent in this respect. For one 
thing, it has been argued that an exception to the ne bis in idem-principle after an acquittal 
would be plausible, if the acquittal had been caused by fraud by the defendant.80 Secondly, 
the idea that a dismissal of the charges by a foreign court on the basis that the behaviour does 
not constitute a criminal offence according to the lex loci delicti would impede a prosecution 
in the Netherlands, has been severely criticised by Klip.81 The author shows how this far 
reaching consequence has derived from the confusion over the relationship between the 
application of the active personality principle and the international ne bis in idem-effect. 
According to Klip, lack of double criminality would certainly impede the prosecution of a 
Dutch national, whether he had previously stood trial abroad or not, but would not 
automatically rule out renewed criminal proceedings in the Netherlands, if that state were to 
found its jurisdiction on (for instance) the principle of territoriality. Such criticism gives 
expression to a more general concern that the categorical exclusion of the initiation of 
criminal proceedings after sham trials abroad may impede the Netherlands to live up to its 
international obligations. We will return to this problem at the end of the next paragraph. 
 
 
4. What are the legal consequences of a transnational application of ne bis in idem?  
 
In case of conviction, if punishment has been imposed, the sentence must have been enforced 
completely for the ne bis in idem-principle to take effect, so Article 68, paragraph 2 reads. 
                                                          
77 Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1985, p. 11 and 12.  
78 G.J.M. Corstens, Het Nederlands strafprocesrecht, Arnhem 2002, p. 191. 
79 Supreme Court 4 February 1969, NJ 1970, 325. 
80 Remmelink, in: Noyon/Langemeijer/ Remmelink, o.c., (1998), p. 490/491. 
81 A.H. Klip, Ne bis in idem en Bouterse, NJB 1998, p. 2071-2072. 
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This requirement follows from the Dutch determination not to serve as a safe haven for 
detainees who absconded from foreign prisons. Although Dutch legislation provides for the 
transfer of prisoners, the execution of foreign sentences is premised on the existence of a 
treaty.82 Besides, if Dutch nationals were to escape from foreign detention, Article 4, 
paragraph 2 of the Dutch Extradition Act would preclude their extradition for the purpose of 
the (continued) enforcement of the sentence. Custodial measures which have been imposed 
because of diminished responsibility of the offender are to be considered on the same par as 
criminal sanctions.83
  
If the foreign sentence is consumed entirely, the conviction serves as a complete barrier to the 
initiation of criminal proceedings in the Netherlands. In this respect, the Dutch system 
certainly embraces the Erledigungsprinzip. If, on the other hand, the foreign sentence is only 
partially enforced, nothing prevents the Public Prosecutor from initiating fresh proceedings 
and the courts are not legally bound to take the sentence served abroad into consideration. 
Officially at least, the Anrechnungsprinzip is unknown in the Netherlands. As we discussed 
above, the Dutch regulation does not meet the standards of the Schengen Convention which 
prescribes deduction of the foreign sentence in case of renewed prosecution. We suggest 
change of legislation in stead of leaving the matter to the free discretion and the wisdom of 
the courts.84 Finally, it is immaterial whether the reason that the sentence has not completely 
been enforced can be attributed to the convict or to the authorities. 85  
 
Not all sentences which have not been completely enforced allow a second prosecution in the 
Netherlands. Paragraph 2 of Article 68 attaches ne bis in idem-effect to  pardon and lapse of 
time. A general amnesty will probably not be equated to a judicial pardon, because in the 
former case the public authorities have not expressed their opinion on the personal guilt of the 
defendant.86 The inclusion of lapse of time as an impediment to double prosecution is slightly 
spurious and probably superfluous as the statute of limitations for the prosecution will by 
definition have been expired.87 Would Article 68, paragraph 2 allow prosecution of persons 
who are on probation? A second trial will only be precluded if the sentence has become 
irrevocable under foreign law. 
       
The phrase ‘if punishment has been imposed’ has been inserted by Statute of 6 March 1985 in 
order to comply with the European Convention on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings, 
Article 35, paragraph 1 sub c of which explicitly proscribes double prosecution if  a foreign 
court has made a declaration of guilt, without imposing a penalty. Article 68, paragraph 3 
extends the protection against double jeopardy by precluding prosecution in the Netherlands if 
the person involved has reached a settlement out of court in order to prevent prosecution and 
has fulfilled the conditions. This provision implies that Dutch courts are to respect a foreign 
discharge of liability to conviction by payment of a fixed penalty. Unconditional decisions of 
foreign authorities that a trial will not take place do not rule out prosecution for the same 
                                                          
82 Article 2 of the Act on the transfer of enforcement of criminal judgments. 
83 Supreme Court 4 February 1969, NJ 1970, 325. 
84 Compare Remmelink, in: Noyon/ Langemeijer/ Remmelink, o.c., p. 495. 
85 In the important Drost-case (Supreme Court, 4 February 1969, NJ 1970, 325) Sweden had requested the 
Netherlands to take over the execution of  custodial measures. After the Netherlands had consented, Sweden had 
evicted the convicts, without formally putting an end to the enforcement of the measures in Sweden. The 
Supreme Court held that even by Swedish standards the enforcement could not be considered as having been 
completed. Corstens ( o.c., p. 196) blames the Supreme Court for ignoring the rational of Article 68, section 2: 
countering the escape from foreign prisons. 
86 Klip, o.c., (1998), p. 2070. 
87 Remmelink, o.c.,p. 496. 
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offence in the Netherlands.88 It is not entirely clear whether Article 68, paragraph 3 covers all 
kinds of plea bargaining and other forms of deals between the Prosecutor and the defendant. If 
the foreign courts honour the arrangements and the reduced sentence is completely enforced, 
Article 68 paragraph 2 will block prosecution in the Netherlands. In other cases the outcome 
is less certain. This takes us to the broader issue of sham trials. 
 
Dutch law does not squarely confront the question whether exceptions should be allowed to 
the rule of ne bis in idem in those cases where a foreign trial is concocted in order to shield 
the defendant. Klip contends that the legislator simply did not foresee the possibility that 
civilised nations would indulge in sham trials and concludes that he did not intend to attach 
any consequences under Dutch law  to ensuing sentences.89 Lensing, on the other hand, 
favours a change of legislation.90 The discussion has gathered momentum since the case of 
Desi Bouterse, former head of the army of Surinam, which raised doubts as to the diligence 
and impartiality of the Surinam courts in proceeding with the inquiry into the possible 
involvement of Bouterse in the so called ‘December-murders’ in 1982.91 The best suggestion 
seems to us to tailor Dutch legislation to the solutions proffered by the Statutes of the ICTY, 
ICTR and ICC.92
 
 
5. What effect does ne bis in idem have on international legal assistance? 
 
Before we elaborate on the Dutch legal position in this respect, we find it useful to dwell upon 
the different meaning of ne bis in idem when applied within the framework of international 
co-operation in criminal affairs. Article 68, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Dutch Penal Code 
generously recognise the effect of foreign res judicata  within the Dutch legal order. (Dutch) 
legal provisions on international co-operation on the other hand, seek, conversely,  to expand 
the ne bis in idem-effect of national court decisions (or of third countries) beyond the national 
borders. To a large extent, the recognition of the foreign dictum in the first case is really 
unselfish, because it may not serve the national interests of the state concerned, whereas in the 
second case the state endeavours to impose its sovereign will on other states. This may at least 
partially explain why the scope of ne bis in idem as a ground for refusal of international co-
operation is often larger.93 Another important difference is that refusal of co-operation on the 
basis of the ne bis in idem-principle does not entirely wipe out prosecution in the requesting 
state. It only precludes assistance by the requested state. 
 
Article 9 of the Extradition Act contains a rather elaborate regulation of the ne bis in idem-
principle as a ground for refusing extradition.94 It is interesting to notice that the provision to 
                                                          
88 P. Baauw, o.c., (1997), p. 80. 
89 Klip, o.c., (1998), p. 2073. 
90 Lensing, o.c., (2000), p. 164.  
91 The Dutch Supreme Court (17 September 2001, NJ 2002, 559) held the Dutch Prosecutor inadmissible, mainly 
because the Netherlands lacked jurisdiction at the moment the murders had alledgedly been committed. For an 
interesting comment: L. Zegveld, The Bouterse Case, in: Netherlands Yearbook of International Law XXXII – 
2001 – p. 97-118. 
92 For further details see infra under III. 
93 In the same vein: H.G.M. Krabbe and H.M. Poelman, Enkele aspecten van het ne bis in idem-beginsel in 
internationaal verband, Arnhem 1985, pp. 133-134. 
94 Act of 9 March 1967, Staatsblad 139, containing new regulations relating to extradition and other forms of 
international assistance in criminal matters, as last amended by the Act of 13 December 2000, Stb. 616. For a 
succinct survey in English, compare A.H.J. Swart, Extradition, in: Bert Swart and André Klip (Eds.) 
International Criminal Law in the Netherlands, Beiträge und Materialien aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für 
ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, Band S 66, Freiburg im Breisgau 1997, p. 110-112. 
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a large extent attaches similar blocking effects to foreign res judicata which obviously 
corresponds with the generous recognition of these decisions in Dutch law. Consequently, an 
acquittal or dismissal of the charges, either by a Dutch court or by the court of a third state, 
serves as an impediment to extradition (Article 9, paragraph 1 sub c). In case of conviction by 
final judgement, extradition is precluded if the penalty or measure imposed has already been 
served, such penalty or measure is not susceptible of immediate enforcement or further 
enforcement (id est in case of conditional sentencing) and if the conviction entails a finding of 
guilt without a penalty or measure having been imposed. Again, the provision does not 
discriminate between decisions of national courts and decisions of foreign courts. The 
Extradition Act does not explicitly put settlements out of court on the same par as final court 
decisions. However, in view of Article 68, paragraph 3 Penal Code, it is only fair to assume 
that extradition will be refused in such cases as well.95
  
In a number of respects Article 9 of the Extradition Act extends the blocking effects of Dutch 
proceedings and judgements beyond those of third countries. For one thing, pending 
proceedings in the Netherlands constitute an imperative ground for refusing extradition. 
According to paragraph 2 however, the Minister of Justice may decide to discontinue criminal 
proceedings after having received an extradition request. Materially, the instruments of 
extradition and transfer of proceedings merge in such cases. Secondly, extradition is barred by 
a decision of a Dutch Prosecutor that proceedings are not to be continued. Article 9, paragraph 
1 sub b refers to Article 255 of the Dutch Code on Criminal Procedure which allows for 
reopening of the case if new evidence has surfaced. To this exception two more are added in 
Article 9, paragraph 3 of the Extradition Statute: extradition would still be viable in those 
cases in which the decision to discontinue proceedings ensued from lack of jurisdiction or if, 
prior to the extradition request, the Dutch authorities had already indicated their preference 
for transfer of proceedings to another state. Finally, the requirement that the sentence should 
be enforced completely does not hold for Dutch convictions. This provision connotes a 
preference for the execution of Dutch criminal sentences in the Netherlands.96  
 
The regulations of the other forms of international co-operation in respect of ne bis in idem 
are, with the necessary modifications, geared to the model presented in the Extradition Act. 
As far as mutual assistance in criminal affairs is concerned, Article 552l of the Dutch Code of 
Criminal Procedure imperatively bars the rendering of such assistance, if compliance with a 
request would contravene the principle underlying Article 68 of the Penal Code and Article 
255, first paragraph of the code of Criminal Procedure.97 Consequently, a request for 
assistance will be denied if final judgement has been passed by a Dutch court or criminal 
proceedings have been discontinued by a Dutch Prosecutor, or if the case has been irrevocably 
decided by a court of a third state, provided that the conditions of Article 68, paragraphs 2 and 
3 have been met. Sjöcrona addresses the interesting question whether the exception 
incorporated in Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Extradition Act – id est if criminal proceedings 
have been discontinued because of the determination that the Netherlands lacks substantive 
jurisdiction – would apply by analogy in case of the rendering of mutual assistance. He 
concludes that, in the absence of an explicit provision by the legislator,  such an application 
by analogy would be unwarranted.98 Just as in case of extradition, Article 552l, paragraph 1 
                                                          
95 In the same vein: Swart, o.c., (1997), p. 111. 
96 Compare A.H.J. Swart, Nederlands uitleveringsrecht, Tjeenk Willink: Zwolle 1986, p. 240. 
97 In cases of cooperation of joint investigation teams this ground of refusal is not applicable. See the new Article 
552qa Code of Criminal Procedure in the legislative proposal implementing the EU Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Kamerstukken II, 2001-2002, 28351. 
98 J.M. Sjöcrona, De kleine rechtshulp, Arnhem 1990, p. 165-166. 
 PAGE  18
sub c precludes mutual assistance in cases in which criminal proceedings are pending in the 
Netherlands.     
 
With respect to the transfer of criminal proceedings, the ne bis in idem-principle works both 
ways. On the one hand, Article 552y, paragraph 1 sub e of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
forbids the taking over of criminal proceedings by the Netherlands if the proceedings would 
infringe the provisions of Article 68 of the Penal Code. This provision dutifully complies with 
Article 10 of the 1972 Convention on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings which forecloses 
the transfer of proceedings  if this were to militate against the principle of international ne bis 
in idem, as incorporated in Article 35 of the Convention. Interestingly enough, Article 8, 
paragraph 2 of the Convention introduces an exception to the rule by allowing state parties to  
transfer criminal proceedings even though they have irrevocably passed judgement on the 
case themselves. The provision addresses the problem of prisoners, absconding from foreign 
prisons by permitting state parties to take over criminal proceedings if the foreign judgement 
cannot be enforced otherwise, either by extradition or transfer of the execution of the 
judgement. 99 On the other hand, Article 77 of the Penal Code explicitly stipulates that the 
right to prosecute and the right to execute a sentence expire with the transfer of criminal 
proceedings to another state. In no uncertain terms this provision corroborates Article 21 of 
the Convention on the Transfer of Criminal Proceedings. 
 
Finally, the ne bis in idem-principle serves as an impediment to the transfer of the execution 
of sentences as well. According to Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Act  on the transfer of 
enforcement of criminal judgements a sanction imposed in a foreign state shall not be 
enforced in the Netherlands if proceedings in the Netherlands would not be compatible with 
the principle underlying Article 68 of the Penal Code and Article 255, first paragraph, of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure.100 For obvious reasons a similar provision for the reverse 
situation – transfer of execution of a Dutch sentence to another state – is lacking. It is 
assumed that the previous trial will have respected the principle of ne bis in idem and it is for 
the requested state who takes over the execution of the judgement to decide whether the 
transfer of execution infringes the principle of ne bis in idem. However, Article 59, paragraph 
4 of the Act on the transfer of enforcement of criminal judgements guarantees that the transfer 
of the sentenced person suspends ipso jure the enforcement of the sanction imposed upon him 
in the Netherlands.  
 
Dutch legislation does not explicitly contain rules for solving competing claims of 
competence. At several places Acts refer to the principle of “proper administration of justice”, 
which serves as a guideline in deciding whether transfer of criminal proceedings or transfer of 
the execution of a (Dutch) sentence would be propitious.101 Moreover, Article 35 of the 
Extradition Act sums up a number of aspects which should be taken into account, within the 
framework of the proper administration of justice, in case a choice has to be made between 
competing requests for extradition. Nevertheless, the concept of ‘proper administration’ 
serves more as a source of inspiration and a regulative principle, rather than a set of clear cut 
standards. 
 
                                                          
99 See Y.G.M. Baaijens-van Geloven, Overdracht en overname van strafvervolging, Gouda Quint: Arnhem 1996, 
p. 169-170.   
100 Act of 10 September 1986, Staatsblad 464. Likewise, paragraph 1 of Article 7 precludes the execution of 
foreign sentences, if criminal proceedings for the same offense in the Netherlands are still pending.    
101 Compare Article 552t, paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 51 of the Act on the 
transfer of enforcement of criminal judgments. 
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Apart from the consultation procedures, mentioned above, we do not know of a mechanism to 
solve competing claims on an international level either. However, it will be quite interesting 
to follow the developments within the framework of the European Union in this respect. 
Article 35, paragraph 7 of the Treaty on the European Union empowers the European Court of 
Justice to decide on conflicts between the Member States as regards the interpretation and 
application of the instruments, mentioned in Article 34. As framework decisions regularly 
contain provisions on (hierarchy of) jurisdiction and ne bis in idem, conflicts are bound to 
arise and the adjudicative power of the Court will certainly be of avail. 
       
 
III. Ne bis in idem in cases of “vertical national-supranational concurrence”  
 
1. General issues concerning the relationship between national and supranational 
jurisdiction 
 
As host to both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter: 
ICTY) and the International Criminal Court (hereafter: ICC), the Netherlands occupies a 
special position vis à vis these criminal tribunals. It seems unavoidable that this special 
position will influence the relationship between our country and the international courts.  
Hereafter, we will make a distinction between the ad hoc tribunals, established by resolutions 
of the Security Council and the Permanent International Criminal Court. 
 
The Netherlands has enacted legislation in order to enable co-operation with both the ICTY 
and the Rwanda Tribunal (hereafter: ICTR).102 As is well known, the Statutes of both ad hoc-
tribunals have vested the international courts with primary jurisdiction over domestic courts 
which entails the power of the Tribunals to request national courts to defer to their 
competence (Article 8, paragraph 2 ICTR-Statute; Article 9, paragraph 2 ICTY-Statute). This 
principle of primacy logically implies that prosecution and trial by the ad hoc-tribunals will 
bar a second trial by a national court (Article 9, paragraph 1 ICTR-Statute; Article 10, 
paragraph 1 ICTY-Statute). Conversely, trials by a national court will impede a second trial 
by the ad hoc-tribunals, unless the culprit has been convicted for an ordinary crime or the 
national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the 
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted 
(Article 9, paragraph 2 ICTR-Statute, Article 10, paragraph 2 ICTY-Statute). Paragraph 3 of 
these Articles incorporates the “Anrechnungsprinzip” by prescribing that prior sentences by 
national courts should be taken into account in the consideration of the penalty to be imposed. 
 
The Dutch implementing legislation does not explicitly refer to the issue of ne bis in idem. By 
dropping all grounds for refusal, the Netherlands acknowledges the primacy of the jurisdiction 
of the ad hoc-tribunals.103  Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that both the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal Assistance Act and the Rwanda Tribunal Assistance Act instruct the district court, 
considering the request for surrender, to verify whether the person brought before it is really 
the one whose surrender is requested and, more importantly, whether that surrender has been 
                                                          
102 Act containing provisions relating to the establishment of the International Tribunal for the prosecutions of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia since 1991, Act of 21 April 1994, Stb.1994, 308 and Act of 18 December 1997, Stb. 1997, 
754 (co-operation with ICTR). 
103 In the Explanatory Memorandum to the Act of  21 April 1994 the government indicated that all grounds for 
refusal, amongst them the principle of ne bis in idem, would be disregarded, MvT, 2nd Chamber, 1993-1994, 23 
542, no. 3, p. 4. 
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requested on account of offences for which the Tribunals have jurisdiction. A negative answer 
will result in the denial of the request. This verification should be marginal and is not intended 
to challenge the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, so the government wishes to emphasise. It 
merely has to do with the fact that the request for surrender involves deprivation of liberty and 
that the state would be obliged, in view of relevant human rights provisions, to check whether 
this deprivation of liberty is legitimate.104  
 
As far as the International Criminal Court is concerned, the division of competence between 
the Court and domestic jurisdictions is predicated on the principle of complementarity which 
entails primary jurisdiction for national courts. According to Article 17 the ICC is only 
expected to step in whenever states have proved to be either unwilling or unable genuinely to 
conduct criminal proceedings. However, as soon as the ICC has grasped jurisdiction and 
subsequently has tried the accused, resulting in his conviction or acquittal, both the ICC itself 
and any other court are barred from starting new proceedings, so Article 20, paragraphs 1 and 
2 read.105 Conversely, previous criminal proceedings will impede a second trial by the ICC, 
unless those proceedings were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility or were otherwise not conducted independently or impartially and 
were conducted in a manner which was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice. This asymmetric application of the ne bis in idem-principle connotes the 
concept of complementarity and reinforces the presumption behind the ICC jurisdiction being 
different from the one as between states.106  
 
The Netherlands has ratified the Rome Statute in July 2001 and has followed a bifurcated 
approach in the adaptation of its legislation with a view to the implementation of the Statute. 
The preponderant concern was to guarantee that the Netherlands would be able to co-operate 
with and assist the Court as soon as it would come into practice. For this purpose the Act on 
the implementation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court with respect to co-
operation with and assistance to the International Criminal Court and the enforcement of its 
sentences was enacted.107  The Act is largely modelled after the legislation implementing the 
Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR, although its provisions are certainly elaborated in more 
detail. It consists of four parts which deal with surrender of suspects and other persons to the 
Court, other forms of international co-operation, enforcement of the Court’s  sentences and 
“assistance”. The last mentioned concept is a term of art which refers to co-operation in 
respect of the crimes against the administration of the Court such as the threatening of 
witnesses, corruption of officials and tampering with evidence. It is likely that most of these 
crimes will be committed  in the vicinity of the Court and that the Netherlands will hence be 
more involved than other countries. Article 70, paragraph 4 sub b of the Statute makes clear 
that the principle of complementarity does not apply to these crimes.108 It is highly interesting 
to note that the parallel provision to Article 4 of the Acts implementing the Statutes of the 
ICTY and ICTR – concerning the competence of the district court to verify whether conduct 
qualifies as a core crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals -, though featuring in a 
previous draft, has been removed. In its explanatory statement the Dutch government has 
                                                          
104 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 4. 
105 The opening sentence of paragraph 1 – “Except as provided in this Statute”- refers to appeal and revision 
which are not to be considered as infringements of the ne bis in idem-principle. See Immi Tallgren, Article 20 
Ne bis in idem, in: O. Triffterer (ed.) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, Baden-Baden 1999, p. 426.   
106 I. Tallgren, o.c., (1999). p. 420. 
107 Act of 20 June 2002, Staatsblad 314 (“Uitvoeringswet Internationaal Strafhof”: Implementing Act ICC). 
108 Compare also G.A.M. Strijards, Een internationaal strafhof. Jurisdictie en rechtshulpperikelen, 29 Delikt en 
Delinkwent (1999), p. 779. 
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explicitly acknowledged that the ICC should decide over its own competence (the so called 
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz”).109  
 
The second “prong” of the implementing legislation is the (Draft-) Act on International 
Crimes which is clearly intended to enable the Netherlands to comply with its responsibilities 
flowing from the principle of complementarity. The Act fills up some existing gaps and 
lacunae in the field of penalisation of the “core crimes” under Dutch law and provides for 
jurisdiction on the basis of aut dedere, aut judicare. The active and passive nationality 
principle are recognised as appropriate basis for jurisdiction as well. The restrictive 
application of the universality principle amplifies the Dutch position that either the 
International Criminal Court or other states might better qualify to start proceedings. If 
possible the Dutch government would certainly be prepared to enter into negotiations in order 
to attune the decisions in this respect.110 We will return to this later on.        
 
 
2. Prerequisites and scope of prohibition on vertical double punishment 
 
Article 17, paragraph 1, sub b ICC Statute extends the recognition of the non-bis-in-idem 
principle as expressed in Article 20: “The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned.” 
However, the fact that the Statute uses five different terms for the relevant set of facts, thus 
for “idem”, does not offer the best opportunity for a reasonable interpretation of Article 20. 
What is meant by “the case” in Article 17, paragraph, 1 sub a? It must be distinguished from 
“the crime” in Article 20 and “the situation” in Article 13 and 14, as well as “the conduct” in 
Article 17, paragraph 1 sub c. Article 20, paragraph 1, further mentions “conduct which 
formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the 
Court.” By the phrase “except as provided in this Statute”, Article 20 ICC excludes the 
application of the rule on subsequent proceedings in one case, such as appeal or revision 
(Articles 81-85 ICC Statute).111
 
It can be deducted from the complementarity principle that it contains two impediments to 
prosecutions by the international criminal court. Firstly, there is the element, underlining that 
the first task of the prosecution lies with the states, not with the ICC. This can be regarded as 
a bottom up approach. The very first thing the Prosecutor of the ICC therefore should do after 
a crime has been committed is wait and see what happens.112 One could also call this a 
temporal non-bis-in-idem. Pending the investigation by the state, the ICC-Prosecutor may not 
bring the case before the ICC.113 Secondly, it contains a final impediment in the sense that if a 
state has taken action and the national case has come to an end, the case has also come to an 
                                                          
109 Explanatory Memorandum, 2nd Chamber, 2001-2002, 28 098 (R 1704), nr. 3, p. 6 
110 Explanatory Memorandum, Draft Act on International Crimes, p. 18 
111 Tallgren, p.426 margin number 12. 
112 States have many legal ways (based on the Statute) to prevent the Court from operating. They can defend 
their sovereignty quite well. See G. Hafner, The Status of Third States before the ICC, Politi and Nesi, p.253. 
Herwig Roggemann and Petar Šarčević (Eds.), National Security and International Criminal Justice, The Hague 
2002; Claus Kreβ, Vorbemerkungen zu dem Römischen Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes, in: 
Grützner/ Pötz, Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, Heidelberg 2003, p.26, marginnr. 30. 
113 The term was used as to give the ICC the possibility to subject states’ behaviour to a subjective test. See 
Sharon A. Williams, Commentary to Article 17, margin number 22, O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Baden-Baden 1999, p.392. Hafner emphasized the importance 
of paragraphs 2 and 3 saying “that Article 18 gives a State the right to request a delay of the investigations for 
six months if the prosecutor wants to act either upon referral of a situation by a Party State or proprio motu.” 
Hafner 2002, p.249. I have been unable to read that in Article 18. 
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end before the ICC, unless one of the criteria for a second prosecution apply. So in the end, 
the application of the complementarity principle leads to the establishment of a non-bis-in-
idem. As such this is a logical consequence. If the jurisdictions of the ICC and a state are 
concurrent and thus on an equal level, it does not matter who will exercise this jurisdiction. If 
then either the ICC or a state deals with the matter the result must be recognized by the other 
jurisdiction as well. Only the finding that the state or states are unable or unwilling triggers 
the role of the ICC. It brings in an element of primacy in the sense that the ICC determines the 
existence of such a situation and may overrule the relevant state. 
 
For a better understanding we have structured our analysis of the meaning of the principle of 
non-bis-in-idem into five different questions:  
a. What is non? Which new acts are prohibited? (see under III.3 and 4) 
b. What is bis? Which act triggers the principle? (see under III.2) 
c. What is idem? What is the same fact? (see under III.2) 
d. What jurisdictions are bound by the norm? (see under IV) 
e. Who is protected by the principle? (see under V) 
We will further follow the structure of the questionnaire as drafted by the General Rapporteur. 
 
What is bis? Which act triggers the principle? This identifies what decision or act forms the 
first decision. Article 20 mentions a conviction or an acquittal by the ICC (top-down). For 
other courts (bottom-up) not the outcome, but the process as such is relevant: “has been tried.” 
This is correct because under national law other final decisions may exist that are not named 
as a conviction or an acquittal. The ICTY decided in the Tadić case that the fact that the 
investigation into the case had been conducted, the case was brought to Court and this reached 
according to national legal terminology its “final phase”, did not qualify as a situation for 
which Article 10 ICTY Statute had been provided.114 The decision thus raises the question 
whether some form of investigation is sufficient for a finding that there is a final decision? 
How final must the decision then be? Must all (theoretical) remedies have been exhausted?115 
It does not seem to be the case. However, in light of the qualification of parts of Article 17 as 
belonging to the ne bis in idem rule an imbalance emerges. Whereas a decision by the 
Prosecutor of the ICC not to prosecute does not hinder national prosecutors to initiate 
prosecutions, vice versa things are different. Article 17, paragraph 1 sub b declares the case 
inadmissible when “the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned.” Is a 
decision by the prosecutor not to prosecute a final decision (for instance the ICTY 
Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute NATO)? Or do only final decisions by a court qualify? 
What about plea bargaining, out of court-settlements, diversion, deals with criminals, pardon, 
parole, conversion of the sentence and pending prosecutions?116
 
One of the other questions relevant to understand the principle is: What is idem? What is the 
same fact? It is here that we may expect most controversies, disputes and problems regarding 
the application of the principle. Here we search for guidance as to which fact is relevant. Is it 
relevant what happened in reality (the actual or historical or material fact) or is it relevant 
what was on the indictment or what the legal definition of the crime in the Statute or in the 
                                                          
114 ICTY, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non-Bis-In-Idem, Prosecutor v.Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1-T, T.Ch., 14 November 1995, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-I-143. 
115 Lensing, p.97. 
116 See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in: Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court, 
The Making of the Rome Statute, The Hague 1999. Holmes’ remarks on p.58-60 and 76 seem to imply that a 
national decision to pardon or parole would not open up for an examination by the Court. He regards this as the 
“greatest weakness to the complementarity regime.” 
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Penal Code is?117 If we were to recognise the legal definition only, it would not give any 
protection at all. The legal definition or name will always differ from one state to another.118 
States will apply very different standards to define what the same facts are. On a national 
basis states have mixed forms. The same goes for international criminal tribunals. A problem 
could arise if culpability under national law is described narrower as under the law of the 
Statute. If national law would allow for defences that are inexistent under the Statute the 
Court would not be able to declare the case admissible. It seems that, regardless whether we 
apply a bottom-up or a top-down approach, the second court decides whether the prosecution 
concerns the same facts. 
 
For the ICC, the specific rules of the Statute apply. This leads to five important questions. 
What is “the case” in Article 17, paragraph 1 sub a and b? It must be distinguished from “the 
crime” in Article 20 and “the situation” in Article 13 and 14, as well as “the conduct” in 
Article 17, paragraph 1 sub c. Article 20, paragraph 1 further mentions “conduct which 
formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been considered or acquitted by the 
Court.” It seems to us that “the case” refers to a historical fact (not necessarily in the 
indictment) in respect of certain individuals. The “crime” in Article 20, paragraph 2 is limited 
to the crimes as found in the Statute. This would allow prosecution for other crimes on the 
same historical facts. “Conduct” in paragraph 3 of Article 20 has a similar meaning. It differs 
from “crime” in the sense that the conduct may carry a different name tag under national 
law.119 “Conduct which formed the basis of the crimes for which the person has been 
convicted or acquitted” as meant in paragraph 1 of Article 20 (only relevant for the ICC itself) 
seems to rely on the historical facts again. The “situation” of Articles 13 and 14 ICC Statute 
must be regarded as an unidentified conglomerate of historical facts committed by an 
unknown number of individuals.120 Depending on the protection given by a national system, 
this could trigger non bis in idem protection, especially if the national system protects against 
parallel investigations. There are also mixed systems that combine the historical fact and the 
indicted fact in the sense that if the indicted facts are of a different legal character they will 
allow for prosecutions of both facts. An example in ordinary criminal law is the participation 
in a criminal organisation and committing one or more of the individual offences of which the 
organisation is accused of.  It is not difficult to come up with similar situations in the field of 
international crimes: the prosecution of murder as a crime against humanity and as genocide 
and as a murder under ordinary law. 
 
The question of who is addressed by the norm is not only relevant in the context of a vertical 
relationship between a state and an international criminal court. Is a ICC-state bound by a 
decision of another ICC-State? It can be argued that if the ICC ought to respect a decision (res 
judicata) of a state, a logical consequence would be that a third state also must recognize the 
state decision, because it would also have to respect a decision of the ICC. Article 20 ICC 
must be implemented into national law or applied directly by state authorities. It is very 
interesting to see that due to the complementarity principle non Party states may bind the 
                                                          
117 Only facts are relevant. In proposals during the negotiations reference was also made to prohibiting 
accusations based “on the same evidence.” See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/51/22 (1996), Vol.II, p.202, published in M. Cherif Bassiouni, The 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, A Documentary History, Transnational Publishers 1998, p.548. 
118 Britta Specht, Die zwischenstaatliche Geltung des Grundsatzes ne bis in idem, Heidelberg 1999, p.160. 
119 According to Holmes, the rationale for the difference between crime and conduct was never fully explained. 
See Holmes, o.c., p.58. 
120 Nsereko, Commentary, p.398 margin number 6. 
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ICC.121 However, it does not work vice versa. A non Party state is not bound by a decision of 
the ICC. 
 
The Statutes of the ICC, ICTY and ICTR explicitly preclude a second trial by domestic courts 
for acts constituting “core crimes” for which the person involved has already been tried by the 
International Tribunal (Article 9 ICTR-Statute, Article 10 ICTY-Statute, Article 20, paragraph 
2 ICC-Statute). These provisions stand to logic, because –as far as the ICC is concerned -  a 
trial by the ICC presupposes a prior decision, based on the principle of complementarity, that 
no appropriate national jurisdiction is available. However, the issue may involve intricate 
legal questions which ensue from the fact that the ICC’s jurisdiction is restricted to the gravest 
crimes which are of concern to the international community as a whole. What would for 
instance be the outcome if the ICC were to acquit the accused of charges of rape constituting a 
crime against humanity, because of lack of evidence that the rape was part of a widespread or 
systematic pattern? Would the acquittal stand in the way of a trial by a national court of the 
accused for rape as an ordinary crime?122 Obviously, one may counter that such issues should 
be addressed at an earlier stage, when the Court decides on challenges to its jurisdiction, but a 
ruling on prima facie admissibility does not exclude the possibility that the objection is raised 
again in view of additional evidence. One might argue that the qualification of rape as “crime 
against humanity” and rape as an ordinary crime are not the same in a legal sense (nor in a 
moral sense). The issue has been identified and discussed by the Preparatory Committee in its 
meeting in 1998. From the choice of the phrasing “for a crime referred to in Article 5” one 
should infer the intent to ensure that a person who commits  a crime under national law will 
not escape responsibility simply because it has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt that 
the acts constituted a crime in the jurisdiction of the ICC. The disadvantage of this approach 
however, is that a person convicted for an international crime by the ICC may be tried for 
crimes under national law for the same conduct.123 Another problem involves the question 
what should be done if a convict absconds and seeks refuge in another country. For the 
Netherlands this situation will not give rise to difficulties, as (continued) enforcement of the 
Tribunals’ sentences is provided for in legislation. 
 
Issues coming up: the same facts and multiple charges 
It is unclear how international criminal tribunals will interpret the relationship of ne bis in 
idem, multiple charges and the amendment of the indictment. From the case law of the current 
two ad hoc tribunals it is clear that the interpretation of  “the facts” is similar in the 
assessment of  multiple charges and in dealing with the question of whether an amendment of 
the indictment is admissible. The issue of whether “the same facts” of the ne bis in idem 
principle must be interpreted identically to “ the same facts” of multiple charges in the 
indictment has not arisen yet. Especially in view of the complementarity principle, it is likely 
that the ICC or other international(ised) tribunals will use an identical criterion. 
 
The ICC Statute and other statutes emphasize the importance of the process in the sense that it 
should not be a sham trial. None of the statutes pays any attention to the concept of the same 
facts. To the contrary: As demonstrated above, the ICC Statute further contributes to the 
confusion. This situation does leave room for interpretation. This issue relates to the ideas on 
the rationale of the ne bis in idem principle. If one emphasizes that an accused should not be 
punished twice for the same conduct, one would follow an identical concept of facts for ne bis 
                                                          
121 See Flavia Lattanzi, The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, M. Politi and G. Nesi, The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A challenge to impunity, 2002, p.181. 
122 The example is given by Strijards, o.c., (1999), p. 776. 
123 I Tallgren, o.c., (1999), p. 428. 
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and for multiple charges. The result would be that multiple charges were unacceptable. If one 
emphasises that an accused should not be bothered twice there is no problem with differing 
concepts of the same facts. 
 
In the case law of the ICTR some of these issues have surfaced. In the case of Kayishema and 
Ruzindana the Defence had argued that the Trial Chamber could not convict for both 
genocide and crimes against humanity, because there was a concurrence of violations in 
relation to the same set of facts. The Trial Chamber accepted this in situations where offences 
have differing elements, or where the laws in question protect differing social interests. The 
Chamber first determined whether concurrence of genocide and crimes against humanity 
could occur.124 On the basis of four examples, it found that one may at the same time have the 
specific intent required to commit genocide and also to act pursuant to a policy that may fulfil 
the intent requirements for some crimes against humanity. In addition, with regard to 
protected social interests, the Trial Chamber found that the two crimes may overlap in some 
scenarios, while not in others. The killings at each one of the crime sites took place as part of 
the policy of genocide, but might also prove the commission of crimes against humanity 
(murder/ extermination). “Therefore the Trial Chamber finds that the elements of the crimes 
are the same for all three types of crimes and that evidence used to prove one crime is used 
also to prove the other two.”125 As a result no more than one offence was committed. 
Otherwise the accused would have been convicted twice for the same crime. “If the 
Prosecution intended to rely on the same elements and evidence to prove all three types of 
crimes, it should have charged in the alternative. As such, these cumulative charges are 
improper and untenable.”126 The Trial Chamber therefore regarded the relevant charges of 
crimes against humanity in the present case fully subsumed by the counts on genocide, and 
found both accused not guilty of the former.  
 
In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge Khan held that problems resulting from cumulative charging 
should be solved by concurrent sentencing.127 The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tafazzal H. 
Khan in Kayishema and Ruzindana was followed by a judgement of the Trial Chamber in 
Rutaganda, half a year later. The Prosecutor charged Ruzindana cumulatively in the 
indictment. His overall activities were regarded as Genocide and Crimes against humanity. 
Three specific acts were characterised by the Prosecution as Crimes against humanity and 
Violations of common Article 3. With regard to the concurrence of various crimes under the 
Statute, the Trial Chamber fully concurred with the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tafazzal H. 
Khan in the case against Kayishema and Ruzindana and cited the ICTY: “The Prosecutor may 
be justified in bringing cumulative charges when the Articles of the Statute referred to are 
designed to protect different values and when each Article requires proof of a legal element 
not required by the others.”128 The Chamber held that the offences covered under the Statute 
(genocide/ crimes against humanity/ violations of common Article 3) have disparate 
                                                          
124 See ICTR, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, T.Ch.II, 21 May 
1999, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-II-555, par. 628. 
125 See Judgement, par. 644. 
126 See Judgement, par. 649. Please note that the Trial Chamber also puts emphasis on using the same evidence. 
127 See ICTR, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tafazzal Hossain Khan regarding the verdicts under the 
charges of crimes against humanity/ murder and crimes against humanity/ extermination, Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, T.Ch.II, 21 May 1999, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-II-555, par. 52. 
Further ICTR, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, T.Ch.I, 2 September 1998, ALC-II-
399, and ICTR, Judgement and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, T.Ch.I, 6 December 
1999, ALC-II-709. See a Commentary by Kai Ambos and Steffen Wirth in ALC-II-701-708. 
128 See ICTY, Decision on Defence Challenges to Form of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, 
Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Santic, Alilovic, Josipovic, Katava, Papic, Case No. IT-95-16-PT, 15 May 
1998. 
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ingredients and the respective punishment for each is aimed at protecting discrete interests. It 
therefore allowed the claim of multiple offences for the same act “in order to capture the full 
extent of the crimes committed by an accused.” 
 
The reasoning of the Trial Chamber is but a summary of the Akayesu case.129 In that case it 
also referred to a decision of the ICTY in the Tadic case.130 The Trial Chamber of the ICTY 
held that the emphasis was not on the cumulative charging as such, but on its relevance for the 
penalty: “In any event, since this is a matter that will only be at all relevant insofar as it might 
affect penalty, it can best be dealt with if and when matters of penalty call for consideration. 
What can, however, be said with certainty is that penalty cannot be made to depend upon 
whether offences arising from the same conduct are alleged cumulatively or in the alternative. 
What is to be punished by penalty is proven criminal conduct and that will not depend upon 
technicalities of pleading.”  
 
We return to the question of whether it is acceptable to convict the accused of two offences in 
relation of the same set of facts. In the Akayesu case and cited in Rutaganda the Trial 
Chamber formulated three separate circumstances in which it would accept that this was 
possible: “(1) where the offences have different elements; or (2) where the provisions creating 
the offences protect different interests; or (3) where it is necessary to record a conviction for 
both offences in order to fully describe what the accused did. However the Chamber finds that 
it is not justifiable to convict an accused of two offences in relation to the same set of facts 
where (a) one offence is a lesser included offence of the other, for example, murder and 
grievous bodily harm, robbery and theft, or rape and indecent assault; or (b) where one 
offence charges accomplice liability and the other offence charges liability as a principal, e.g. 
genocide and complicity in genocide.”131
 
The Trial Chamber in the Kayishema and Ruzindana case also discussed whether the accused 
may be convicted of two offences in relation to the same set of facts (ie crimes against 
humanity (murder) and crimes against humanity (extermination)). In paragraph 422 of the 
Judgement it stated that “Both murder and extermination are constituted by unlawful, 
intentional killing. Murder is a (sic) the killing of one or more individuals, whereas 
extermination is a crime which is directed against a group of individuals.” The Trial Chamber 
had already held Rutaganda criminally responsible for crimes against humanity 
(extermination). On the basis of the same facts it could not also hold him responsible for 
crimes against humanity (murder). The latter is already included in the finding of the former. 
In terms of a verdict the result is that the accused was declared “not guilty” of crimes against 
humanity (murder). This is strange because the Trial Chamber had established that he was 
guilty of the crime charged, but this crime was also part of an even more serious crime for 
which the accused was also found guilty. It would have been preferable had the Trial 
Chamber stated that the accused “cannot also be held criminally responsible” for the other 
crime.132 This illustrates that this count had to be charged alternatively rather than 
cumulatively.133
 
                                                          
129 See ICTR, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, T.Ch.I, 2 September 1998, ALC-II-
491-493, par.461-470. 
130 See Decision on Defence Motion on Form of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 
T.Ch.II, 14 November 1995. (Tadic (1995) I ICTY JR 293 at p.303). 
131 Akayesu, Judgement, par.461-470 and Rutaganda Judgement, par. 421. 
132 See par. 424 and 427. 
133 See also Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, in: Klip/ Sluiter ALC-IV-66-68. 
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A related issue is the question as to whether the accused had been indicted on the basis of 
command responsibility or individual responsibility, an early Blaškić decision tells us that this 
must be clear at the stage of the initial appearance. This was necessary to permit the accused 
to prepare his defence. The accused understood his rights such that he must be able to identify 
from the indictment whether he is charged as having committed the offences himself, or as 
having ordered the offences (command responsibility). The Trial Chamber in the Krnojelac 
case referred to the Blaškić decision in response of an argument made by the Prosecution: 
“The Prosecution has suggested that the decision in Prosecutor v. Blaškić (...) has said to the 
contrary, but that is not correct. That decision makes clear that the accused must be able to 
prepare his defence on “either or both alternatives” (emphasis added).”134 As appears from the 
Krnojelac decision, the Trial Chamber considered that it may be required of the Defence to 
prepare for both situations. This view is consistent with a decision in the Kvočka case by 
which the Prosecution was directed to “provide more information as to the specific acts of two 
accused, that would establish their criminal responsibility under Article 7, paragraph 1, and 
Article 7, paragraph 3.”135 What first seemed an issue relevant in the context of the vagueness 
of the indictment is now an issue of criminal responsibility as well. Without mentioning its 
earlier decision, the Blaskic Trial Chamber convicted in the same set of facts both on 
paragraph 1 as on paragraph 3.136 Judges Hunt and Bennouna, dissenting from the majority in 
Delalic, argued that also here cumulative charging is permissible, but cumulative convictions 
not.137 This seems to be followed by the Trial Chamber in Krnojelac, holding that “Where the 
Prosecutor alleges both heads of responsibility, the Trial Chamber has a discretion to chose 
which is the most appropriate head of responsibility under which to attach the responsibility 
of the Accused.”138
 
In Kupreskic, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY adopted the so called Blockburger test. This 
requires the following: “The test then lies in determining whether each offence contains an 
element not required by the other. If so, where the criminal act in question fulfils the extra 
requirements of each offence, the same act will constitute an offence under each 
provision.”139 In February 2001 the ICTY departed from this, what it called Tadic-Akayesu 
test. It is hard to believe that the three different chambers rendering judgement on the 20th, 
22nd and 26th of February 2001 did not orchestrate their views on cumulative charging. The 
Appeals Chamber formulated the (now) prevailing rule: “Cumulative charging is to be 
allowed in light of the fact that, prior to the presentation of all of the evidence, it is not 
possible to determine to a certainty which of the charges brought against an accused will be 
proven. The Trial Chamber is better poised, after the parties’ presentation of the evidence, to 
evaluate which of the charges may be retained, based upon the sufficiency of the evidence. In 
addition, cumulative charging constitutes the usual practice of both this Tribunal and the 
                                                          
134 ICTY, Decision on Defence Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based upon Defects in the Form thereof 
(Vagueness/ Lack of Adequate Notice of Charges), Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-PT, T.Ch. I, 4 
April 1997, p.7 footnote 21, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-III-57. 
135 ICTY, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motions on the Form of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. Kvočka/ Kos/ 
Radić/ Žigić, Case No. IT-98-30-PT, T.Ch.III, 12 April 1999, par. 32-33, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-III-111. 
136 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, T.Ch.I, 3 March 2000, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-IV-
477 and the commentary by Keijzer and van Sliedregt, ALC-IV-656-667. 
137 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalic/ Mucic/ Delic/ Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, A.Ch., 20 February 
2001, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt and Judge Mohamed Bennouna, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-
V-567. 
138 ICTY, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, T.Ch.II, 15 March 2002, par. 173. 
139 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic/ Kupreskic/ Kupreskic/ Josipovic/ Papic/ Santic, Case No. IT-95-
16-T, T.Ch.II, 14 January 2000, ALC-IV-703, par. 682. 
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ICTR.”140 For the ICTY, the issue then became a matter of cumulative or multiple 
convictions. In Musema the ICTR Appeals Chamber formally accepted this distinctive 
element test.141
 
The test provided by the Appeals Chamber in Delalic is:  
“412. Having considered the different approaches expressed on this issue both within this 
Tribunal and other jurisdictions, this Appeals Chamber holds that reasons of fairness to the 
accused and the consideration that only distinct crimes may justify multiple convictions, lead 
to the conclusion that multiple criminal conviction entered under different statutory provision 
but based on the same conduct are permissible only if each statutory provisions involved has a 
materially distinct element not contained in the other. An element is materially distinct from 
another if it requires proof of a fact not required by the other. 
413. Where this test is not met, the Trial Chamber must decide in relation to which offence it 
will enter a conviction. This should be done on the basis of the principle that the conviction 
under the more specific provision should be upheld. Thus, if a set of facts is regulated by two 
provisions, one of which contains an additional materially distinct element, then a conviction 
should be entered under that provision.”142
 
It is also necessary that the element materially distinct from another should require proof of 
fact not required by the other: “Applying the provision of the test articulated above, the first 
issue is whether each applicable provision contains a materially distinct legal element not 
present in the other, bearing in mind that an element is materially distinct from another if it 
requires proof of a fact not required by the other.”143 The consequence of this test is that 
under these circumstances cumulative convictions for both Articles 2 and 3 and Articles 3 and 
5 are permissible.144
 
Two judges in the Appeals Chamber dissented from the view of the majority relating to the 
application of the test to determine whether two crimes are legally distinct. In addition, they 
disagreed with the way in which a choice must be made if two crimes are distinct. These 
judges critisize the method of the majority, in their view, neither the different value, nor the 
comparison with national jurisdictions do offer any help here. In their eyes allowing 
cumulative convictions may prejudice the rights of the accused.145 They do not accept a 
                                                          
140 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalic/ Mucic/ Delic/ Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, A.Ch., 20 February 
2001, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-V-369. This view is now generally accepted. See ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. 
Kunarac/ Kovac/ Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, T.Ch.II, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-V-617, par.548; 
ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No., A.Ch., 5 July 2001, par.78; ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. 
Krstic, Case No. , 2 August 2001, par.659; ICTY, Appeal Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic/ Kupreskic/ 
Kupreskic/ Josipovic/ Papic/ Santic, A.Ch., 23 October 2001, par.385; ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kvocka/ 
Kos/ Radic/ Zigic/ Prcac, T.Ch., 2 November 2001, par. 214; ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac/ Kovac/ 
Vukovic, A.Ch. 12 June 2002, par.167; ICTR, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1A-T, T.Ch.I, 7 
June 2001, par.108. 
141 ICTR, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, A.Ch., 16 November 2001, par.363. 
142 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalic/ Mucic/ Delic/ Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, A.Ch., 20 February 
2001, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-V-369, par.412 and 413. See also ICTY, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. 
IT-97-25, T.Ch.II, 15 March 2002, par. 502. 
143 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalic/ Mucic/ Delic/ Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, A.Ch., 20 February 
2001, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-V-369, par.421. 
144 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kvocka/ Kos/ Radic/ Zigic/ Prcac, T.Ch., 2 November 2001, par. 212. 
145 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalic/ Mucic/ Delic/ Landzo, Case No. IT-96-21-A, A.Ch., 20 February 
2001, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt and Judge Mohamed Bennouna, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-
V-567, par.23. 
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gradation of specificity amongst the offences of the Statute.146 They demonstrate that it is 
almost always possible to find unique contextual elements and that the test does not serve a 
purpose.147 There is no such thing as an additional element.148 Judges Hunt and Bennouna 
would allow for taking into account the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence.149 
Regarding the choice that should be made they propose to consider all of the elements of the 
offence to arrive at the closest fit between the conduct and the provision violated.150 In order 
to express their opinion that a cumulative conviction is not acceptable, the two dissenting 
judges suggest the following terms: “Not guilty on the basis that a conviction on this charge 
would be impermissibly cumulative.”151 Whilst the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac still does 
not depart from its “Celebici/ Blockburger” test, it admits “ that it is deceptively simple. In 
practice, it is difficult to apply in a way that is conceptually coherent and promotes the 
interests of justice.”152
 
From the case law of the ICTR and ICTY it becomes clear that the non-bis-idem principle 
does not prohibit the prosecution at the same time on the basis of one historical fact for two 
(or more) offences (multiple charges). The ad hoc Tribunals have adopted an argumentation 
based on an abstract comparison of the offences, not on what the accused actually did. This 
case law allows for cumulative charging of the same conduct either as, for instance, war 
crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity. The question subsequently arises what the 
consequence of this law is for a second prosecution for a different offence on the same 
historical facts. Especially in view of subsequent prosecutions (national after international or 
international after national) this approach does not offer any assistance. It is only helpful in 
cases in which there is only one exclusive forum that can make decisions. 
 
 
3. Legal consequences of ne bis in idem in the vertical plane, including possible 
differences between the “top-down” and the “bottom-up” context    
 
Most questions raised under this heading have already been addressed, implicitly or explicitly, 
in the previous paragraphs. The application of the Erledigungsprinzip and the failure to apply 
the Anrechnungsprinzip which is open to criticism do not differ substantially within the 
context of vertical concurrence, although the last mentioned problem is certainly less acute in 
view of the possibility, incorporated in the Dutch implementing legislation, to take over the 
execution of the sentences of international tribunals. Only a final judgement by the 
International Tribunals on the merits of the case will preclude a second prosecution in the 
Netherlands. It is self-evident that a ruling of inadmissibility, in accordance with Article 17 of 
the ICC-Statute, will not bar criminal proceedings. Conversely, pending proceedings in the 
national state do not have a ne bis in idem-effect and therefore do not impede a trial by an 
international tribunal. This issue, although apparent from the plain phrasing of the relevant 
provisions, was decisively settled by the ICTY in the Tadic-case in which the German 
authorities, after having suspended their own proceedings, had complied with the Tribunal’s 
                                                          
146 idem, par. 41, relying on the Appeals Chamber in ICTY, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals, Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis, A.Ch., 26 January 2000, Klip/ Sluiter ALC-IV-419, par. 69. 
147 Idem, par.28-32. 
148 Idem, par. 43-45. 
149 Idem, par.33. 
150 Idem, par. 37 and 52. 
151 Idem, par.59. 
152 ICTY, Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac/ Kovac/ Vukovic, A.Ch. 12 June 2002, par.172. 
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request to surrender the accused.153 In his commentary to the case, Lagodny rightly observes 
that the opposite outcome would fully undermine the very system of an international criminal 
tribunal, as it would preclude local authorities from initiating criminal investigations.154 The 
failure in Dutch law to redress sham trials does not impede the obligation on the part of the 
Dutch authorities to co-operate with the international tribunals in case of a finding by these 
tribunals that a second trial is warranted. The last question whether national courts would be 
bound by factual determinations made by supranational courts in their dealing with domestic 
issues, though an interesting one, has not been addressed so far by the Dutch courts or 
legislator. 
 
  
4. What is the effect of the ne bis in idem principle on international legal assistance?  
 
After having established that there is an earlier decision on the same facts, the question arises 
what constitutes a second act concerning these facts. What is non? Which new acts are 
prohibited? Does this only relate to acts aiming at prosecution in the authorities’ jurisdiction 
or does this also have its implications on acts of investigation by which a state assists another 
state by rendering mutual legal assistance? The effect of the application may differ according 
to the measures sought. As mentioned earlier, if a request for extradition is refused, it is likely 
that the requesting state will not be able to continue the proceedings. This is not necessarily so 
with requests for mutual legal assistance. Also here it is relevant whether states apply the 
Anrechnungsprinzip or the Erledigungsprinzip.155
 
In the famous Blaskic-case, the ICTY depicted the model of co-operation between states and 
the ad hoc Tribunals as a vertical one which implied an unconditional and absolute duty for 
states to co-operate. It added that “ a plain reading of Article 29 of the Statute makes it clear 
that it does not envisage any exception to the obligation of States to comply with requests and 
orders of a Trial Chamber”.156 The Dutch Acts implementing the Statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR seems to corroborate this point of view by excluding all the prevailing grounds for 
refusal in its relationship with both tribunals. As was mentioned before, the acts only 
prescribe verification of the identity of the requested person and the examination of the 
jurisdiction ratione materiae. Although the model of co-operation envisaged by the ICC-
Statute may best be described as a mixture between the “horizontal” or inter-state relationship 
and the vertical model, the Dutch Implementing Act of the ICC-Statute is no less exacting as 
to the duty to co-operate on the part of the Dutch authorities.157 The international ne bis in 
idem-principle may not be invoked either as a ground for refusing surrender or for the 
rendering of other forms of co-operation. 
 
It is interesting to point at Article 31 of the Act Implementing the ICC Statute which is geared 
to Article 90 of the ICC Statute and deals with the problem of competing requests. Normally, 
                                                          
153 ICTY, Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non-Bis-In-Idem, Prosecutor v. Tadic, 14 
November 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-T, par. 33, in: Klip/Sluiter ALC-I-150.  
154 Otto Lagodny, Commentary to Decision on the Defence Motion on the Principle of Non-Bis-In-Idem, 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, 14 November 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-T, par. 33, in: Klip/Sluiter ALC-I-152. 
155 See Christoph J.M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure, Oxford University Press 2001, 
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156 ICTY, Judgement on the request of the Republic of Croatia for review of the decision of Trial Chamber II of 
18 July 1997, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108bis, 29 October 1997, par. 63. 
157 Bert Swart and Göran Sluiter, The ICC and International Criminal Co-operation, in: Herman A.M. von Hebel, 
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the requested state will have to give precedence to the ICC’s request, especially if it is not 
under an international obligation to comply with the other state’s competing request. Article 
90 only portrays two situations in which the solution to the predicament is not self-evident. 
Paragraph 6 mentions the case where the requesting state is not a party to the Statute while the 
requested state is under a treaty obligation to comply with the request; paragraph 7 refers to 
the situation in which the request relates to other conduct than that which constitutes the crime 
for which the Court seeks the person’s surrender. Article 90, paragraph 6 mentions several 
factors which should be taken into account by the requested state in making its decision. One 
of these factors involves the possibility of subsequent surrender between the Court and the 
requesting state. This construction may however raise problems in view of the ne bis in idem-
principle which should be taken into account by both the requesting state and the ICC.158
 
A less hypothetical case would involve the situation in which a perpetrator of “core crimes” 
after having received a sham trial in another country would escape to the Netherlands. Article 
68, paragraph 2 of the Penal Code would – as explained before – usually preclude a second 
trial in the Netherlands. However, the International Criminal Court may, after having ruled on 
the admissibility of the case, request the surrender of the person and the Netherlands would be 
under an obligation to comply with this request. Of course this may give rise to conflicts of 
interpretation as to whether the Court would have competence and jurisdiction to try the case. 
For one thing, the person sought for surrender may challenge the jurisdiction of the Court 
because of presumed violation of the ne bis in idem-principle. Article 89, paragraph 2 of the 
ICC-Statute explicitly mentions this possibility and dictates that the requested state shall 
immediately consult with the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on 
admissibility. If the case is admissible, the requested state shall proceed with the execution of 
the request forthwith, but it may postpone the execution of the request until the issue has been 
settled. Secondly, the state whose criminal proceedings are disqualified as unsatisfactory may 
raise an issue under Article 19 of the ICC-Statute and challenge the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court. In order to solve such conflicts of interpretation, Article 97 of 
the Statute provides for  a general consultation procedure which has been adopted in Article 7 
of the Dutch Implementing Act. However, in final instance the Dutch government will 
comply with the decision of the ICC. 
 
 
5. Change of regime 
 
Fortunately the Netherlands’ experience is rather old and limited to the decisions of the 
German criminal courts during the second World War. The German legislation providing for 
criminal trials was already declared inexistent by Royal decree of the Government in exile in 
1944.159 However, it took until 1952 before all German decisions were deleted from the 
Dutch judicial records.160
 
 
IV. Ne bis in idem in cases of “horizontal inter(supra)national concurrence” 
 
 
                                                          
158 In the same vein: I. Tallgren, o.c., (1999), p. 433.  
159 See Besluit van 17 september 1944, houdende vaststelling van het Besluit bezettingsmaatregelen, Stb. 1944, 
E93. See further G.E. Mulder, Schijn van recht, Arnhem 1995, p.121. 
160 See Geraldien von Freitag Drabbe Künzel, Het recht van de sterkste, Duitse strafrechtspleging in bezet 
Nederland, Amsterdam 1999, p.252-253. 
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1. Positive conflicts between supranational jurisdictions 
 
It is obvious that positive conflicts of jurisdiction exist between the ICC and the ICTY, 
between the ICC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, between the ICC and the Special 
Chambers of the Criminal Court in East Timor. Since the ICTR only has jurisdiction over 
crimes committed in 1994 and the ICC only over crimes committed after June 2002, there is 
no overlap. 
 
When analysing the various elements of the ne bis in idem rule we identified the importance 
of determining what jurisdictions are bound by the norm. Here it is relevant to see whether the 
norm has any impact on non-State jurisdictions, such as internationalised tribunals and in the 
relationship between ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.  This question must be answered 
affirmatively. Internationalised tribunals qualify under Article 20 as “another court”.161 The 
ICC Statute does not refer in that Article to any link with a State, as it for instance does in 
Article 17. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is also bound by its own decisions (Article 20, 
paragraph 1 ICC).162  
 
 
2. Resolution of jurisdictional conflicts 
 
Positive conflicts of jurisdiction could be solved through consultations aiming at the most 
appropriate place for the prosecution. As far as this decision making process is concerned, we 
suggest that tribunals with a limited (or specialised) jurisdiction for only one country or one 
conflict, in principle seem to be more qualified for trying such cases than the ICC. 
 
 
V. Concluding Questions and Recommendations 
 
Who is protected by the principle?  
One of the elements that is not discussed is who is protected by the principle. Facts as 
mentioned earlier stand in connection with the person. That does not help us in complicated 
situations like the criminal liability of entities that may exist on a national level that coincides 
with the prosecution of individuals of the same crimes on an international level. 
  
Parallel prosecutions and joint prosecutions 
The non bis in idem principle does not protect against parallel prosecutions of several states. 
However, the admissibility requirements for the ICC do so in the relationship state-ICC 
(Article 19, paragraph 7).163 New developments, especially within the European Union raise 
new questions that do no fit into the system we just described. Interesting questions pop up 
when it comes to concurrent/ parallel prosecutions in two different jurisdictions for the same 
fact. The astonishing consequence seems to be that there is a race between various 
prosecutors, whereby the “winner takes it all”.164 However, the jurisdictions that are 
prosecuting may not be aware of that fact. The question is whether it should not follow from 
(the rationale of) the recognition of a final judgment that recognition of the principle should 
                                                          
161 Tallgren, p.427 margin number 15. 
162 Theoretically the Prosecutor with the ICTY and ICTR could prosecute again for the same fact. This must be 
regarded as an unintended lacuna of the drafters. 
163 Under the Statute of the ad hoc tribunals, the primacy did. See Morris and Scharf, The International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, 1998, p.312-325. 
164 See Lagodny, o.c., p.39. 
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also take place much earlier, in the phase that both states are investigating. That would not be 
an easy rule to apply. Who should recognise whom and refrain from further prosecution? And 
what would be the criteria for that: starting point of the investigation or prosecution? The 
applicable jurisdictional principle or the presence of the accused? 
 
Human rights considerations 
Traditionally, human rights treaties protect against a second trial/ investigation only when it 
takes place within the same state. From a perspective of the ECHR (and the ICCPR) in the 
light of the “collective responsibility” (Preamble and Art.1 ECHR), the question must be 
raised whether the importance of being two jurisdictions is not reduced. If the concept “state” 
looses its meaning, it should not result in less protection for the individual. That raises the 
question whether concurrent jurisdiction should not lead to the recognition of foreign res 
judicata. This view is also adopted in Article 50 of the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Freedoms, which reads: “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in 
criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or 
convicted within the Union in accordance with the law.” Article 4 of Protocol Nr. 7 ECHR 
protects  against a second prosecution or punishment within one state. Individualisation in 
respect of human rights should take place at the level of the accused not at the level of states. 
This results in a standard by which the cumulative acts of two or more party states have 
violated the convention rights of one individual, not whether an individual act of an individual 
state violated the rights of the accused.165 This seems to be a much better option than to bring 
transnational non-bis-in-idem under the right to a fair trial as expressed in Article 6 ECHR.166 
In this context we may refer to a Resolution Section IV B.4 adopted by the XVIth 
International Congress of Penal Law: “The principle of ne bis in idem should be regarded as a 
human right that is also applicable on the international or transnational level. Consideration 
should be given to incorporating this principle in the ICCPR and in regional human rights 
conventions. (…).”167
 
Exceptions to ne bis  
Now we have established the contents of the principle it is important to identify whether any 
exceptions exist. Both in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the question is being 
discussed whether new evidence (nova) may lead to the reopening of the case.168 Is this 
acceptable? Does it make a difference whether it is in favour of the accused or not? Arsanjani 
referred to situations in which national law allows for more defences excluding criminal 
responsibility than the Statute. The ICC would then be bound by an acquittal or any other 
decision not imposing a penalty.169 Can one argue that as long as some form of review is 
possible the decision is not irrevocable? Are there any cases of non-recognition? The 
appearance of such a rule in the Statutes raises this question. The Statutes do not give a ne bis 
protection to sham-proceedings.170 This basically comes down to a disqualification of such a 
procedure as a genuine trial conducted by an impartial court. Unlike the non-bis-in-idem 
protection, the exceptions in Article 10 ICTY to the rule seem to take a formal criterion: 
                                                          
165 See Klip, The Decrease of Protection under Human Rights Treaties, 68 International Review of Penal Law 
1997, p.291-310. 
166 Britta Specht, Die zwischenstaatliche Geltung des Grundsatzes ne bis in idem, Heidelberg 1999, p.49-53. 
167 See 70 International Review of Penal Law 1999, p.908, Preparatory Colloquium of Section IV in Utrecht, the 
Netherlands, Congress in Budapest, Hungary. 
168 P.A.M. Mevis and T. Kooijmans, Herziening ten nadele, Roterdam 2003. 
169 See Mahmoud H. Arsanjani, Reflections on the International Criminal Court, Essays in Honour of Adriaan 
Bos, T.M.C. Asser Press 1999, p.63. 
170 Article 20 ICC Statute was copied into the Recommendations of The Law Commission, see Report on Double 
Jeopardy and Prosecution Appeals, No.267, p.76-78. 
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“characterisation as an ordinary crime.” This phrase has not been copied into the ICC-Statute, 
because ordinary crimes could also give rise to severe penalties (e.g. life imprisonment for 
murder).171 This is a point that also has been discussed in the Netherlands.172 The Dutch 
system is based on the fiction that the integrity of foreign authorities is not in dispute. It is 
interesting to see that the accused loses the protection also in cases in which he did not 
contribute to the sham character of the proceedings. 
 
A current issue? 
Following the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant as of 1 January 2004, we may 
expect quite some cases in which other states request the surrender of persons to which the 
Netherlands would apply Article 54 Schengen or Article 68 Penal Code. In that sense the 
application can be regarded as a protection of Dutch decisions against an extensive use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by other states. There is no evidence that the principle frustrates 
the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the Netherlands. 
 
Concluding remark 
It is our understanding that the most prominent issue regarding the application of the principle 
ne bis in idem is the interpretation of “the same (set of) facts”. As long as that is not decided 
on an international level, disputes may arise. It has been our aim to identify some of the 
problems related to this and to suggest some solutions. 
                                                          
171 See Safferling, p.328-329 and Tallgren, p.429 margin number 22. 
172 An unconditional recognition of foreign decisions has been in the Penal Code since 1886. It was undisputed 
for more than a century. See A.H. Klip, Ne bis in idem en Bouterse, NJB 1998, p.2069-2075. 
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